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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past several decades, there has been an irreversible change in the nature of the 
physician–patient relationship [1-5]. Patients are seeking more medical information and are 
actively participating in decisions affecting their health [6-10]. Such change has attracted 
substantial attention in a variety of fields including health policy [11-17], health economics [18-
24], and medical practice [25-30]. There is agreement across board that informed patients should 
be one of the cornerstones of a patient-centered U.S. healthcare system in the future [31-41].  
 
These studies, from different fields, investigate the impact of patient-obtained medical 
information (POMI) on the physician-patient relationship from very different view points, but 
they share one basic assumption: that one patient’s relationship with his1 physician would be 
impacted solely by his own POMI. For example, studies in medical practice and health policy 
investigated the impact of individual patient’s POMI on his relationship with the physician, on 
his utilization or outcome, without any discussion on the potential influence of POMI of other 
patients on such aspects as utilization, outcome or relationship with the physician [11-17, 25-30]. 
Studies in health economics view the relationship as a one-to-one interaction in which the 
physician observes perfectly the patient’s information level without any discussion of 
information of other patients or patient population [18-24].  
 
But there is substantial evidence [38-41] that in medical practice, physicians draw inferences 
from characteristics of a patient population as surrogate for the characteristics of a particular 
patient and make medical decisions partly based on such population characteristics. For example, 
patients’ demographic and/or socioeconomic characteristics are often used in medical registry or 
other forms of practice guidance or clinical decision tools to guide physician practice [38-41]. So 
it is entirely possible that physicians will also use patient population’s POMI as surrogate for an 
individual patient’s POMI. 
 
                                                 
1
 For convenience, we assume that the patient is a male and physician a female. 
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While existing studies on the impact of POMI on physician-patient relationship provide insights, 
we believe that additional insights will be gained by taking into account the impact of patient 
population’s POMI on individual patient’s relationship with the physician. The first reason for 
this is that physicians may not observe an individual patient’s information level perfectly. For 
one thing, physicians usually do not have sufficient time to make a perfect observation of a 
patient’s information level [42-46]. For another, while physicians can get some signal about a 
patient’s information level from his socioeconomic or health status [47-49], studies show that 
physicians ability to predict patient’s information level are far from perfect [50-56]. It has long 
been established in economics that such imperfect ability of service providers (i.e., physicians) to 
distinguish different customers (i.e., patients) means that service providers (physicians) may 
have to react to customers (patients) on a population basis [57-63], suggesting the possibility of 
one customer (patient) influencing another’s relationship with the service provider (physician).  
 
The second reason for my research is that there exist significant variances in utilization among 
patients with different socioeconomic characteristics [64-68] and in different geographic regions 
[69-77] that cannot be fully accounted for by known causes [78, 79]. It is possible that some 
variability is caused by the influence of one patient’s POMI on another’s utilization, as patients 
of the same socioeconomic group or geographic region usually seek services from the same 
group of physicians [79-82]. Physicians may act on a population basis, contributing the persistent 
socioeconomic and regional utilization variances.  
 
In this dissertation, multidisciplinary studies were carried out to investigate if a patient’s 
relationship with the physician could be influenced by a patient population’s POMI when the 
physician does not observe perfectly the patient’s information level. After reading this 
dissertation, you will discover that when a physician cannot distinguish the information levels of 
individual patients within a patient population, she would base part of her interaction with 
patients on information about the total population, not on the information of the particular patient 
she interacts with. In other words, a patient’s relationship with his physician is partially shaped 
by the information of the patient population. For example, even if they have the same level of 
information, a 35-year-old Caucasian lady may be treated differently than a 60-year-old African 
American gentleman. 
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You will also discover that per capita utilization of several healthcare services in a county has a 
non-linear relationship with the POMI in that county, suggesting that one patient’s utilization 
might be influenced by other patients’ POMI in the same county. Finally you will discover that 
physicians of different demographic, socioeconomic and practice characteristics have different 
attitude towards POMI. So, while a patient’s relationship with his physician is shaped by 
information of the population, a patient may be able to selectively choose physicians with more 
positive attitude towards POMI based on the physician’s characteristics. In what follows, I will 
discuss these findings in more detail. 
 
In chapter two, a game-theoretical model was built in which a physician interacts with a 
heterogeneously informed patient population. Using existing models [23-24] as benchmark, it 
was found that while more information in a patient population generally means more productive 
physician-patient relationship, a conclusion shared with existing models [21-27], introducing 
additional well-informed patients to the population discontinuously affects the physician’s 
strategy, having no effect unless a sufficient quantity of such well-informed patients is added. In 
other words, the physician’s interaction with a particular patient from a population is partially 
shaped by the information of the population, not solely by the information of that particular 
patient. 
 
To empirically test the findings of chapter two and to see if the non-linear effects predicted 
contribute to the regional variations in healthcare utilization [69-77], an empirical test was 
performed in chapter three using data from the 2000-2001 Community Tracking Study (CTS) 
Household Survey and the 2003 Area Resource File (ARF). It was found that healthcare 
utilization in US counties does not increase in direct proportion to the ratio of patients with 
POMI in a county. As the POMI ratio increases in a county, utilization rates would increase in a 
non-monotonically fashion, remaining stable until the ratio crosses some critical value, at which 
point utilization rates increase suddenly. Such findings are consistent with predictions of chapter 
two, and they suggested that future study in regional variances should take into account the ratio 
of well-informed patients in a region, as such ratio was shown to have a non-linear effect on 
utilization. 
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Findings in chapter two and three suggest that the physician-patient relationship is influenced by 
the information of the population from which the patient comes from. Does this mean that the 
patient can do nothing to change his interaction with the physician? In chapter four, I turn 
attention to the differences in attitude and reaction towards POMI among physicians with 
different socioeconomic, demographic and practice characteristics, since individual patients can 
choose which physician to visit and receive services [35, 36]. Data from the 2000-2001 
Community Tracking Study Physician Survey suggests that physicians of male gender, older age, 
international training, race other than white, and overall personal financial incentive favoring 
expanding services are more likely to have positive attitudes towards POMI and more willing to 
order tests, procedures or prescriptions upon patients’ requests.  
 
The dissertation shows that we can gain important insights by taking into account the influence 
of one patient’s POMI on another patient’s relationship with the physician: the physician-patient 
relationship under the impacts of POMI has important characteristics that are not captured by 
existing studies. For example, while existing models indicated that whenever we provide 
information to a patient, we make that patient (and only that patient) better off, the dissertation 
shows that we can make a whole patient population better off by educating some of patients 
within that population, but that providing information to some patients may have no impact on 
physician behavior. Such findings have important implications on our efforts to alleviate or 
eliminate the wide spread disparities in healthcare utilization among populations of different 
socioeconomic [64-68] characteristics and geographic regions [69-77] (more discussion on the 
conclusion section of the dissertation). 
 
The findings of this dissertation should be interpreted within the context of the methodology and 
the data that were analyzed, and it is important to note several limitations (which are also 
opportunities for further study). For one thing, the theoretical study did not address the issue of a 
physician community serving a patient population. Such exclusion of physician community left 
out potentially important issues such as physicians learning from peers [79] and competition 
among physicians [83-85]. Inclusion of these issues in future studies may provide important 
insights. For another, the empirical study in chapter three used counties as the unit of analysis. 
Since patients in a county are likely to receive services from more than one local physician 
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communities, using counties as the unit of analysis may leave out important local details [79]. 
Future studies using local community as the unit of analysis may provide important details.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
THEORETICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent studies indicate that patients not only obtain medical information from the Internet and 
other sources but also use this information to influence their clinical medical decisions [1-3]. 
Studies also show that physicians may respond to such patient-obtained medical information 
(POMI), as some physicians are even willing to order treatments, tests, or procedures that they 
would not otherwise order [4-5]. So POMI impacts the physician-patient relationship, as existing 
studies in the health economics predicted [6-10] and as studies in medical practice and health 
policy suggested or confirmed [11-15]. These studies also suggested that the physician’s reaction 
would be based on an individual patient’s POMI by linking a patient’s interaction with the 
physician and/or the resulting utilization directly to the patient’s POMI [6-15].  
 
But we have reasons to believe that physicians may be unable to perfectly observe an individual 
patient’s POMI and instead rely heavily on the patient’s demographic, socioeconomic and/or 
health characteristics as imperfect signals for the patient’s POMI [16-18]. Such reasons include 
physicians’ time constrains [19-21] or the patients’ collecting information from physician-
independent sources after receiving a physician’s treatment recommendation but before 
accepting such treatment [22-24]. If this is the case, the physician is actually reacting to the 
POMI of a patient population (i.e., patients with certain demographic, socioeconomic and/or 
health characteristics), not to the POMI of a particular patient. In other words, when a physician 
interacts with a patient, she sees the patient as one member of a patient group (population) with 
similar demographic, socioeconomic and/or health characteristics, and she uses the population 
POMI as surrogate for the POMI of this particular patient. The practice of using the 
characteristics of a patient population as surrogate for characteristics of a particular patient has 
been widely reported in the medical literature, as patients’ demographic and/or socioeconomic 
characteristics are often used in medical registry or other forms of practice guidance to guide 
physician practice [25-28]. 
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When the physician uses such a surrogate, the interaction between the physician and the patient 
may be different from the results of existing models, where the physician reacts to the POMI of 
the particular patient. In this study, we investigated such physician-patient interaction in which 
the physician relies on the POMI of a patient population as surrogate for the POMI of the patient. 
Using a game-theoretic approach, we found that when there are two levels of POMI in the 
population, one information level will be “dominant” in the sense that the physician will treat the 
entire population in the same way, decided solely by that information level.  
 
Which information level becomes the dominant information level is determined by several 
factors, including the quality of information at each level, the relative number of patients at each 
information level, and the physician’s and patients’ payoffs. When the low information level is 
the “dominant” level (i.e., when few patients are well-informed), introducing additional well-
informed patients to the population discontinuously affects the physician’s strategy, having no 
effect unless a sufficient quantity of patients is added. Increasing the precision of the information 
level of the few well-informed patients has no effect on the physician’s strategy. Alternately, 
when the high information level is the “dominant” level (i.e., when a sufficient number of well-
informed patients exist), increasing the precision of their information allows all patients to free-
ride by receiving more appropriate treatment recommendations. Counterintuitively, we also 
identify circumstances under which increasing the general level of information may potentially 
harm patients. 
 
Literature 
 
A series of models known as the supplier-induced demand (SID) literature was developed over 
the past several decades to study the physician-patient relationship when there exist information 
asymmetry and a conflict of interest between the physician and the patient. While criticism 
persists [29], the SID literature still attracts interest and has evolved over time. 
 
Originally, physician-patient interactions were modeled as individual decision-making processes 
in which the physician prescribes treatment to maximize profit while the patient is assumed to 
accept the physician’s recommendation. Evans [6] demonstrates that the physician induces the 
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patient to buy more medical care than the patient would demand in the absence of information 
asymmetries. Farley [7] finds that even when the physician’s incentives directly incorporate the 
patient’s utility function, demand inducement beyond optimal levels still results.  
 
Recent game theoretic models recognize that patients may also act strategically. Patient-
physician encounters become an interaction between two asymmetrically-informed decision 
makers each acting to maximize his or her respective utility [8-9]. These approaches provide 
insight into the strategic situation physicians and patients face when information is asymmetric 
and their interests do not fully coincide. Dranove [8] endows the patient with some (albeit 
imperfect) information which is used to evaluate the prescribed treatment and potentially reject 
the demand set by the physician. Equilibrium demand induced by the physician is still higher 
than what the patient deems optimal but it depends on the level of a patient’s initial information. 
The more accurate such information is, the closer equilibrium demand is to the patient’s optimal 
level. Following the ideas of strategic information transmission from Crawford and Sobel [30] 
and Pitchik and Schotter [31], De Jaegher and Jegers [9] model the physician-patient relationship 
as a game of strategic information transmission. While the patient is uninformed about  his 
optimal treatment,  his ability to make the final decision as to which treatment option to choose 
compels the physician to reveal some information in equilibrium. One additional contribution of 
De Jaegher and Jegers [9] is that they used ideas of credence goods [32] to allow for inducement. 
Their argument is that only when the patient is unable to tell even ex post the effectiveness of at 
least some treatment options (i.e., such treatments are credence goods) is the SID hypothesis 
relevant. 
 
We adopt the approach of De Jaegher and Jegers [9], assuming that the physician knows with 
certainty a patient’s true medical state but recommends a treatment option strategically. In 
modeling patients’ medical information, we use an approach similar to Dranove [8], where 
quality of information is reflected in the accuracy of his estimate about his medical state. In our 
model, information serves the sole purpose of increasing the accuracy, or level of confidence, of 
the patient’s estimation about his medical state, and his medical state is defined as which 
treatment option is the best for him. De Jaegher [10] extended their original paper [9] by adding 
patient information, but in his model, information is added as a “cue” from Nature so the 
 14
information is either present or not without the possibility of modeling various levels of 
information, and the focus in his model is to see how adding patient information to their one-to-
one model would change their original result. In our model, the focus is on how information 
distribution among the population impact the interaction. So we extend both models by 
introducing a patient population within which there are multiple levels of information. By 
modeling this way, we are able to setup and vary multiple levels of information to study the 
impact of such changes on the physician-patient relationship. By taking a similar approach to 
existing models, we isolate the role of heterogeneously informed patient populations on the 
physician-patient interaction.  
 
Conceptual Overview of the Model 
 
While most patients prefer having POMI [3], the impact of POMI on the physician-patient 
relationship depends greatly on the situation. It is conceivable that there are situations when the 
patient may not have either the incentive (e.g., minor condition such as cold) or time (e.g., time 
critical condition such as internal bleeding) to use POMI to challenge/influence the physician or 
to seek a second opinion when not satisfied, or when the patient’s condition is so critical (e.g., 
heart attack) or expected outcomes of some treatment options are likely to lead to malpractice 
lawsuits (e.g., prescription of large dose of Celebrex) that concerns over the patient’s welfare 
and/or possible malpractice lawsuits are likely to overweigh any personal preference of the 
physician. In situations like these, POMI may have minimal impacts on the interaction. 
 
On the other hand, there are many situations where POMI impacts the interaction significantly. 
An example would be when the patient’s condition is serious but not urgent, and none of the 
treatment option is the obvious optimal choice. In such a situation the patient has incentive to 
gather POMI and POMI would have significant impact on the interaction because the physician 
has incentive to use her superior information to pursue her own preference and the patient has 
incentive to use POMI to counteract the physician’s behavior.  
 
We conceive of a population of patients who share a common medical condition and a physician 
who treats such patients. Two treatment options (A and B) are available, with the physician 
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preferring one (B) to the other (A). There are many possible reasons for the physician’s 
preference, including limited resource for a particular option or a desire for increased monetary 
return. Patients do not always share this preference; they desire the option that brings them the 
most individual benefit. Prior to the physician visit, patients gather information and make an 
estimation of the two available options. Different patients may prefer different treatment options, 
and such differences may depend on such factors as a patient’s lifestyle, resilience to side effects, 
and risk tolerance. During the encounter, the physician and the patient exchange information and 
make a decision on which treatment option to implement. As Charles et al pointed out [33], in 
such a shared-decision making process when the two parties have different information and 
treatment preferences, they may agree on a treatment option, or they may fail to reach agreement 
and the patient has to go to another physician.  
 
The results of such shared-decision making process obviously depend on the structure of the 
process, but to the extend that such process can be modeled as formal bargaining process, it can 
be shown that under reasonable assumptions and certain conditions, the bargaining process can 
be effectively modeled as a “take-it-or-leave-it” model in which the physician makes a “take-it-
or-leave-it” offer and the patient can either accept and receive the offered treatment or reject and 
go to another physician.  
 
To begin with, given the facts that the physician is the expert and the gatekeeper of the 
healthcare system, it is reasonable to assume that only the physician can make offers. Moreover, 
given the fact that a typical physician-patient interaction takes about 15 minutes [19-21], it is 
reasonable to assume the time cost of delaying agreement takes the form of possible termination 
of bargaining after the first round if no agreement has been reached, as discounting future payoff 
is not appropriate for such a short time period. Finally, given the fact that there is only one way 
for the two players to share the surplus if trade occurs (i.e., the physician keeps the payoff from 
performing the agreed-upon treatment, while the patient keeps the payoff of receiving such 
treatment), it is reasonable to assume that the physician’s offer is in the form of the probability of 
“truth-telling” (i.e., )|( αpi A  in a mixed strategy. We will give a more formal definition of this 
degree of “truth-telling” shortly after).  
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Given the information structure of the model, it will be shown in Appendix A.4 that in 
equilibrium, if agreement can be reached, it will be reached within two periods since there is no 
reason to postpone agreement after two periods. The existence of the second period depends on 
the relative values of the parameters. If screening cannot occur, in equilibrium the bargaining 
will end in the first round; otherwise, in equilibrium the physician makes an offer in the first 
round which is accepted by the lesser-informed patient but rejected by the more informed 
patient, and she makes another offer in the second period if bargaining is not terminated and such 
offer is accepted by the more informed patient. If the physician can successfully screen different 
types of patients, then the equilibrium results of the first type to be screened would be different 
than those under full information, but the equilibrium results of the second type to be screened 
would be the same as those under full information.  
 
Since the results under full information have been widely studied [8-9], this paper focuses on the 
situation where the physician cannot successfully screen different types of patients. Such focus is 
further justified because when the number of types of patients increase, the physician’s ability 
and willingness to screen decreases, and empirical evidences show that physicians’ ability to 
distinguish the information levels of patients with similar socioeconomic and health 
characteristics is very limited [16-18].  So we model the physician-patient interaction as “take it 
or leave it” nature; the physician makes a treatment recommendation, the patient can then either 
accept or reject the recommended treatment but may not negotiate with the physician to 
reconsider.  
 
Since patients may prefer A or B depending on various factors, the physician actually faces two 
subgroups of patients, one initially preferring treatment A, the other B. Note that within each 
subgroup, different patients may have different confidence levels of their initial assessments, 
although every patient within the subgroup shares the same initial assessment. 
 
When these two subgroups of patients visit the physician, the interactions are quite different. For 
patients who initially prefer treatment B, the same as the physician, the interaction would be 
straightforward: the patient requests treatment B and the physician happily obliges. While it is 
possible that some patients in this subgroup are better served by treatment A, there is no reason 
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for the physician to recommend A since patients will certainly accept B. On the other hand, the 
interaction between the physician and patients whose preferences are opposite to hers exhibits 
tension: the physician has to persuade the patients to change their minds if she wants them to 
take her preferred option. Thus, the amount of information conveyed in a physician’s 
recommendation becomes of central importance. For this reason, we focus our attention on the 
interaction between a physician and the subgroup of patients whose initial preference is for 
treatment A, contrary to the physician’s interest. In the rest of this paper, a “patient” or “patient 
population” will refer to this subgroup.  
 
The likelihood that a patient will accept the physician’s recommendation depends on how certain 
the patient is about his state, which, in turn, depends on the quality of information the patient has 
gathered. While physicians are endowed with superior medical information, the possibility that 
the physician’s interests may differ from the patient’s leads patients to keep a cautious ear when 
considering the physician’s recommendation. Such suspicion, in turn, makes the physician think 
twice before recommending a non-preferred option because doing so regardless of an individual 
patient’s situation will lead patients to reject the physician’s services outright. 
 
If all patients are similarly informed, existing models describe the resulting physician-patient 
interaction [8, 9]. We envision different patients within the same socioeconomic group 
potentially having varying levels of information. Sacchetti and Zvara [34], for example, note the 
quality differences of medical information patients obtained on the Internet. Alternatively, we 
can think of dissimilar qualities of information resulting from different predictive powers of 
various screening tests patients may undertake. Some patients may be quite informed about the 
treatment options due to accessibility to information or their ability to adequately research and 
assimilate such information. These patients can have a fairly accurate assessment as to which 
option is best for them, and they may be unwilling to follow the physician’s recommendation if 
that recommendation differs from what they believe is best for them. Other patients may be 
particularly uninformed and tend to follow the physician’s recommendation even if it differs 
from their initial beliefs. Certainly, the physician’s incentive to recommend the “right” treatment 
from the patient’s perspective is greater when facing a more informed patient who is more likely 
to reject a less desirable suggestion.  
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Model 
 
We study the interaction between a physician and a patient population, and we focus on how the 
physician will act when she does not or cannot observe the information level of an individual 
patient and therefore must balance the greater value captured from ill informed patients against a 
greater chance of rejection from well informed patients. We model the interaction as a Bayesian 
game of incomplete information [35, 36, 37]. The physician knows only the distribution of 
information levels in the patient population. 
 
Each patient is in one of two states, either α orβ, corresponding to the patient’s best treatment 
option, A or B. Thus, a patient in state α is best serviced by treatment A and treatment B is best 
for patients in stateβ. We denote the set of patient states by S≡{α,β } with arbitrary element s and 
the set of treatment options by T≡{A,B,0} with arbitrary element t where t=0 reflects no 
treatment. Patients are unaware of their state but the physician, who is assumed to have perfect 
information about the patients’ medical condition, assesses the state with complete accuracy. 
Denoted by u(t|s) is the patient’s utility from receiving treatment t when  he is in state s. 
Assumption 1. )|(0)|0()|( ααα BuuAu >=>  and )|(0)|0()|( βββ AuuBu >=> . 
We interpret the treatment t=0 as rejecting the physician’s recommendation and normalize its 
utility to 0. The utility u(0|s) may be thought of as the cost of rejecting the recommendation and 
going to another physician. The assumption that both u(0|α) and u(0|β) are equal to zero is made 
to simplify the analysis but is not important to the nature of the equilibrium under study. Further, 
we assume that obtaining the less desirable treatment is strictly worse than rejecting the current 
recommendation and getting another chance for the desired treatment. Otherwise, the patient will 
accept any recommendation by the physician which in turn implies that the physician will always 
recommend her preferred treatment.  
Prior to their accepting any physician recommendations, patients obtain medical information 
which provides some imperfect information about their state. We consider two types of patients, 
high types with more accurate information and low types with worse information, denoted by 
i∈{h,l}. A patient is a high type with probability q and a low type with probability 1-q. A patient 
 19
of type i has a likelihood of being in state α given by }|Pr{ ispi α=≡ . A patient with high 
information is more likely to be correct about  his true state )01( >>≥ lh pp . We are interested 
in situations in which the interests of the patients and the physician diverge. Thus, we assume 
that a physician always prefers treatment B while the patient population of interest initially 
prefers treatment A.  
Assumption 2: )|()1()|()|()1()|( βαβα AupAupAupAup llhh −+>−+  
       > 0 
         > )|()1()|()|()1()|( βαβα BupBupBupBup hhll −+>−+  
Assumption 2 implies that prior to the encounter with a physician, patients prefer treatment A to 
0 to B. Also, better informed, high type patients have stronger preferences than low types. Better 
information implies a greater certainty that one is in state α and thus a greater expected utility 
from accepting treatment A. Denote by v(t) the physician’s utility from performing treatment t. 
Since we wish to focus on disjoint patients’ and physician’s interests, we assume that 
v(B)>v(A)>v(0) and normalize v(0)=0. To summarize the timing of the game:  
1. Nature determines the patient’s type, or information level, i∈{h,l} with Pr{i=h}=q. The 
type is observed by the patient but not the physician. Nature also determines the patient’s 
state, s∈{α,β} with ipis == }|Pr{ α . The state is observed only by the physician. 
2. The physician recommends a treatment option t from two possible options A and B. 
3. The patient either accepts or rejects this recommendation. 
4. The players receive their payoffs )|( ),( stutv .  
The extensive form representation (game tree) of this game is shown in Figure 2.1. In the next 
section we proceed to locate a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
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Figure 2.1 The extensive form of the game 
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Equilibrium Analysis 
 
Physician’s Strategy Space 
 
The physician has four possible pure strategies in the form of recommending one of two 
treatments t upon observing one of two states s. Denote by )|( stpi  the probability with which the 
physician recommends treatment t in state s. A mixed strategy profile for the physician is 
represented by the pair )|( αpi A  and )|( βpi B  indicating the likelihood that a physician 
prescribes treatment A (B) when the patient is in state α (β). We define the level of information 
transmission from the physician to the patient as: 
)|()|( βpiαpi BAI ×=  
 
Obviously, 0 ≤ I ≤ 1. I = 0 implies that there is no information transmission in the interaction; I = 
1 implies that the physician’s recommendation perfectly and accurately reveals the patient’s state 
(please note that when )|( αpi A = )|( βpi B = 0, we have I = 0 but technically one could argue that 
there is perfect information transmission since the patient can infer perfectly  his true state. But 
since we would never expect a physician to act in such a way as always lie to the patient, we can 
safely ignore such situation.). We use I as a key indictor of the physician-patient relationship and 
physician behavior (in fact, we will show in Proposition 6 later in this section that I is 
proportional to patient welfare, so I captures both the level of information transmission and the 
level of patient welfare). Because the physician has strictly ordered preferences over the 
treatments, v(B)>v(A)>0, perfect information transmission (I=1) cannot occur in equilibrium , as 
noted in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, I<1  
The proof of this and all other propositions is in the appendix.  
 
Patient’s Strategy Space 
 
Each patient type (low and high information) has four possible pure strategies, in the form of 
accepting or rejecting each of the two possible recommendations. Denote by pii(t) the probability 
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that a patient of type i∈{h,l} accepts recommendation t∈{A,B}. Thus, a strategy profile for the 
patient consists of a four-tuple, { )(Ahpi , )(Bhpi , )(Alpi , )(Blpi }.  
 
The values of )(Ahpi  and )(Bhpi  or )(Alpi  and )(Blpi  reflect the level of trust patients place in 
the physician: larger values indicate a greater willingness to accept the physician’s 
recommendations.    Because a high type patient is more certain about  his state than a low type 
)( lh pp > , we have the following relationship when both options are recommended with 
positive probabilities: 
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium in which both treatment options are recommended 
with positive probability, we have:  
(i) )(Alpi > 0  )(Ahpi = 1  
(ii) )(Ahpi < 1  )(Alpi  = 0  
(iii)  )(Bhpi > 0  )(Blpi = 1 
(iv) )(Blpi < 1  )(Bhpi = 0. 
Corollary 2.1. In equilibrium, )()( AA lh pipi ≥ , )()( BB lh pipi ≤ . 
Part (i) of Proposition 2 arises because, if )(Alpi > 0, a low type must view accepting treatment A 
at least as favorably as rejecting it. Since the high type is even more likely to be in state α ( his 
prior is higher than the low type, by assumption 2),  he can expect strictly positive expected 
utility from accepting treatment A. Similar arguments can be made to parts (ii) ~ (iv). 
Corollary 2.2. In equilibrium, )(Bhpi < 1. 
Intuitively, if a highly-informed patient always accepted recommendation B, then low types 
would also accept recommendation B. Faced with B being universally accepted, the physician 
will find it profitable to always recommend B. But then both types of patients will find it 
profitable to always reject recommendation B, leading to a contradiction. 
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Equilibrium 
 
The behavior of patients and physician from the previous two subsections allows us to deduce 
the equilibria of the physician-patient interaction game. Signaling games often permit a 
multiplicity of equilibria because the players can entertain a whole range of out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs. However, as we demonstrate below, all but one class of equilibria are quite unappealing. 
For example, a physician may believe that patients will always reject any of her 
recommendations. Then, the physician is indifferent between all of her strategies. An equilibrium 
is found in which the physician always misrepresents – proposes treatment A for patients in state 
β and treatment B for those in state α. Patients, of course, reject both recommendations, 
confirming the physician’s beliefs.  
 
While some such equilibria seem absurd, most nevertheless survive multiple refinements, 
including perfection [38] and sequential rationality [39]. In what follows below, we concentrate 
on one equilibrium in particular. Before turning to this equilibrium, in the appendix we carefully 
derive alternate equilibria. However, all other equilibria fall into one of two classes. First are 
equilibria in which patients reject all physicians’ recommendations. Thus, the physician-patient 
interaction never yields any treatment option adopted by the patient, negating the role of the 
physician entirely. Second are equilibria in which the physician simply recommends the 
treatment that patients already believe to be the better option prior to the encounter with the 
physician. That is, the physician simply recommends treatment A to all patients, and all patients 
accept. This class of equilibria envisions the physician as an open pharmacy, dolling out 
whatever treatment the patient believes to be in his best interest. While such an outcome may be 
appealing in the sense that the patient always gets what he asks for, the physician’s expert 
knowledge becomes worthless as the patient never gains from the physician’s expertise. 
 
Both of the alternate equilibria described above paint a stark picture of the physician-patient 
interaction. Either no treatment is accepted or the patient always receives what he desires. Even 
the latter scenario may be bad for the patient because even if he is wrong about his state, and 
even when informing him that he is wrong is in both his and the physician’s interest, the 
physician refrains from passing along this information. Below, we present the candidate 
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equilibrium which does not suffer from the above drawbacks, and then note several reasons for 
selecting this candidate equilibrium. 
Proposition 3: The following is an equilibrium of the patient-physician interaction game: 
)|( βpi B = )(Ahpi = )(Alpi =1 
)(Bhpi   =
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The equilibrium strategies depend on the value of q, the proportion of the population with high 
information. Specifically, the frequency with which the physician recommends option A to type 
α patients and the probability with which patients accept treatment B depends on whether the 
proportion of high types is above or below a critical threshold q*. The implications of this 
equilibrium are presented in the next section. First, we note several properties of this equilibrium 
that are not shared by the other equilibria discussed above and presented in the appendix. 
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The equilibrium of Proposition 3 is the only equilibrium in which the physician’s strategy 
conveys any useful information and it is the only equilibrium in which both treatment options are 
accepted by patients with positive probability. These properties suggest that the physician-patient 
relationship, while not perfect (in the sense of the information transmission level being less than 
one), is more than a buyer-seller relationship. The properties also suggest that when a patient 
goes to a physician,  he is willing to listen to the physician, albeit suspiciously, and the physician 
is willing to take the patient’s demand into account, albeit not fully as there exists a conflict of 
interest. It is our belief that real-world physician-patient interactions, while not perfect because 
of possible conflicts of interest and information asymmetry, do achieve a positive level of trust 
and information transmission as predicted by this equilibrium. 
Proposition 4. The candidate equilibrium is the only equilibrium in which the 
information transmission level I is strictly greater than 0. 
 
The parameter I is also an indictor of the physician-patient relationship and physician behavior. 
When I = 0, the patient gains no information from the relationship, and the physician does not 
take the patient’s interest into account at all. 
 
Beyond being the only equilibrium with positive information transmission, we may appeal to 
focal point theory to rule out other equilibria. If one equilibrium has some property that 
conspicuously distinguishes it from other equilibria (such as being Pareto optimal), and if this 
property is common knowledge among the players, then this equilibrium is likely to be the 
unique outcome [40]. The assumption that players can coordinate on a Pareto optimal (or payoff 
dominant) outcome has proven useful in many applications. For example, see Katz and Shapiro 
[41] in a network context and De Jaegher and Jegers [9] in a model underlying this work.  
 
The candidate equilibrium has two focal properties. First, the physician receives higher expected 
profit in this equilibrium than in any other. As the first mover, it may be reasonable to conceive 
of the physician as selecting the equilibrium. Second, under specific conditions, this equilibrium 
Pareto dominates all others.  
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Proposition 5.  The physician receives higher expected utility under the candidate 
equilibrium than under any other equilibrium. Further, the candidate equilibrium Pareto 
dominates all other equilibria when )|()|()1()|()|()1( αββα BuAuppBuAupp hllh −<− . 
While the information transmission is important, what matters most to policy makers is patient 
welfare. If we define patient welfare U  as the expected utility of the patient in equilibrium, then 
in the candidate equilibrium, U is proportional to I, as indicated in Proposition 6 below. 
Proposition 6. In the candidate equilibrium, U = [ ]lh pqqpIAu )1()|( −+α . 
Please see appendix for proof. Because of this property, we will focus our attention on I in our 
discussion. 
 
Information, Patient welfare and the Physician-Patient Relationship 
 
In this section, we examine the properties of the established equilibrium outcome. First and 
foremost, we are concerned with patient welfare, U (or I, since U  is proportional to I). Then, a 
successful efficient physician-patient encounter requires that the physician uncovers a patient’s 
true type and the patient accepts the associated treatment option. Hence, the information 
transmission level, I, reflects the quality of physician-patient relationship as it denotes the 
amount of candor in the physician’s recommendation. Further, the value of I may reflect the 
interests of public policy institutions for whom q , hp and lp  may serve as policy instruments that 
can be changed by such institutions to achieve desired outcomes. In the text that follows, we will 
focus on I. Please note that because we focus on the patient population whose initial preference 
is option A, when we change the information level of some patients ( hp  or lp ), or when we 
change the relative ratio of the two types of patients ( q ), we necessarily change the overall 
probability that option A is the true optimal option. The following four theorems establish the 
influence of POMI on the physician-patient relationship.  
Theorem 1. In equilibrium, 
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0=
∂
∂
q
I
 when q≠q*.  
That is, for constant information levels hp  and lp  , a local change in the proportion of well-
informed patients will not impact the information transmission level. 
The above theorem notes that the information transmission level, I , does not change with 
q except when q cross the threshold value q *. Since the physician cannot observe a specific 
patient’s information level, she treats every patient in the same way.  How exactly would she 
treat every patient depends on the likelihood of encountering a patient of each type. On one hand, 
if almost all patients are low types (i.e., q < q*, as shown in Figure 2.2 as patient population 1), 
there is little harm from inducing demand. On the other hand, if most are well-informed (i.e., q > 
q*, as shown in Figure 2.2 as patient population 2), then the gains from prescribing the 
physician’s preferred treatment even when it is not best for the patient are likely smaller than the 
losses from well-informed patients refusing such treatments. More specifically, she will act to 
make the high type indifferent between accepting and rejecting B recommendation if q  is 
sufficiently large, and to make the low type indifferent if q  is low. In the first case, the value of I 
depends only on hp , and the second only on lp . We call the high type in the first case or the low 
type in the second case the “dominant” type since the POMI level of such type dictates physician 
behavior. Figure 2.2 illustrates this result. 
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Figure 2.2 Impact of change in the proportion of well-informed patients (q) on the level of 
information transmission (I) 
 
In some sense, the physician has two pre-defined strategies (represented by hI and lI ), and when 
seeing a particular patient, she bases her choice of strategy on the perceived POMI characteristic 
of the patient population. When the patient population is perceived to have few highly informed 
patient (q<q*, patient population 1 on Figure 2.2), the physician chooses lI ; when the patient 
population is perceived to have many highly informed patient (q>q*, patient population 2 on 
Figure 2.2), the physician chooses hI . In other words, there exist two separate regimes of the 
physician-patient relationship. We call them the “well-informed regime” and the “ill-informed 
regime”. A change in q has no effect on I within a regime but may potentially shift us from one 
regime to the other.  
 
Efforts to increase the quality of care (represented by the information transmission level I) by 
increasing the number of patients well-informed (direct-to-consumer advertising, public 
education programs, etc.) are effective only if the number of patients informed reaches a certain 
critical mass. Otherwise, the physician will just ignore the well-informed patients as long as the 
number of such patients remains small. So in efforts to help patients with lower socioeconomic 
q*q
hI
I
0  1
  
1  
q 
q’ 
1-q 
1-q’ 
lI
hI
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status, it is very important to make sure that a large enough portion of such patients obtain POMI 
so that there will be significant change in physician behavior.  
 
We now briefly discuss what (if anything) changes if we allow the patient to ask strategically for 
options. This would add another step to the game (the patient asks for an option) after nature 
moves but before the physician makes the recommendation. It can be shown (interested readers 
can show this by using an approach similar with that used in the appendix) that in equilibrium, a 
patient will always ask for A regardless of his initial preference, and a patient with initial 
preference of B will always accept the physician’s recommendations regardless of his POMI 
level. So basically, in this expanded game, the physician will have three patient types (the 
original high type and low type plus the additional type of patients who prefer B), instead of two 
in the original model. But since in both models the physician cannot tell a patient’s type, the 
equilibrium results are similar in both models. The physician will treat everyone the same way, 
to be decided by a “dominant” type. Since our main interest is the feature of the equilibrium, we 
can safely assume that patients always tell the physician their initial preferences. 
 
The following result notes the impact of information precision on this critical value q*. 
Theorem 2. The threshold value q * increases with lp  and decreases with hp . 
(i) 0* >
∂
∂
lp
q
;  (ii)
hp
q
∂
∂ *
<0. 
Theorem 2 notes that the threshold value is not exogenous but instead may be lowered either by 
increasing hp  or by decreasing lp . This implies that changes in the information level potentially 
have two effects. The direct effect, of course, is that better information leads to less demand 
inducement by the physician and thus a higher level of information transmission. However, a 
secondary effect implies that changes in information levels may also influence the critical value 
q* and bring about a regime change. These two effects are summarized in Theorems 3 and 4.  
Theorem 3. In equilibrium,  
 30
(i) 0>
∂
∂
hp
I
 when q > q *; 
(ii) 0=
∂
∂
hp
I
 when q < q *’.  
(iii) for small >0, there exists a q<q* such that ε+<< hp
I
hp
I ||  
 
Figure 2.3 Impact of an increase in the precision of high-type information (q) on 
information transmission (I). 
 
Theorem 3 suggests that a change in hp  has two effects. The primary effect is to increase the 
level of information transmission to the right of q*. The secondary effect is to lower the 
threshold value of q for the well-informed regime. Thus, part (iii) of the theorem indicates that a 
small change in the precision of information may change the regime leading to a marked increase 
in the level of information transmission. Figure 2.3 illustrates this result. 
 
Increasing hp  makes the well-informed patients even more informed. For example, if the 
Internet is used to increase distribution of information about clinical trial openings or new 
treatment options, then the patients with Internet access become more informed while leaving the 
general level of information among those without access unchanged. Theorem 3 indicates that 
such programs will have influence on the physician-patient relationship only when we are in or 
*q
 
q  
I  
higher ph 
 
lower ph 
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quite close to the well-informed regime. The effect is most drastic when the proportion of well-
informed patients is just below the critical value. By raising the accuracy of information, 
physicians now find it optimal to concern themselves with the well-informed patients. This 
regime change increases the overall level of information transmission. 
Theorem 4. In equilibrium,  
(i) 0>
∂
∂
lp
I
 when q < q *’;  (ii) 0=
∂
∂
lp
I
 when q > q *.   
(iii) for small >0, there exists a q>q* such that ε+>> lp
I
lp
I ||  
Theorem 4 implies that better information precision among the lesser informed patients is only 
beneficial when in the ill-informed regime, or when the proportion of high types is sufficiently 
small. However, an increase in the precision of information can cause a decrease in the level of 
information transmission if the greater precision precipitates a regime change which makes 
physicians more cautious of these low types. This is demonstrated in Figure 2.4. 
 
This result seems counter-intuitive as an increase in the general information level generally 
makes the physician more cautious. The reason lies in the heart of the physician’s strategic 
calculation: in equilibrium, she makes one patient subgroup indifferent between rejecting and 
accepting her preferred recommendation B (i.e., she choose I between hI  and lI ). Since lesser 
informed patients are always more willing to accept treatment B than more informed ones, we 
have hI  > lI . We also know that the higher q is, the more likely she will pick hI , since picking 
lI  will force all more informed patients to reject her B recommendations. When there is just 
enough number of more informed patients to make hI  the best choice (i.e., the expect payoff 
from hI  is equal to or only marginally larger than that from lI ), an increase in lp  will make lI  
more attractive, because while sticking to hI  would not change expected payoff, switching to lI  
would increase expected payoff: increasing lp  will force lI  to increase, therefore inducing more 
lesser informed patients to accept recommendation B. Under such situation, increasing the 
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information level of lesser informed patients will cause a decrease in the information 
transmission level I.  
 
An increase in lp implies raising the level of information among the least informed patients, 
possibly through health literacy education. Theorem 4 suggests that such programs will have 
influence on the physician-patient relationship only when we are in the ill-informed regime. 
However, the effect need not be positive. By increasing the general level of information, the 
physician may begin to care about the ill-informed patient when before, she concerned herself 
only with the well-informed. This regime change, bringing us from the well-informed regime to 
the ill-informed regime, implies that physician will switch her focus from the well-informed 
patients to the ill-informed ones, treating all patients as if they possess the lower level of 
information. This change will actually lower I and lead to less information transmission from the 
physician to the patient. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Impact of an increase in the precision of low-type information (q) on 
information transmission (I). 
 
Our results share certain features with models which incorporate a single patient type. In De 
Jaegher and Jegers [9], the nature of the interaction induces the physician to reveal some 
information about the patient’s state but this revelation is necessarily imperfect. Similarly, 
Dranove [8] examines a single treatment option that can be offered in different quantities and 
finds that the level of demand inducement is a function of the patient’s information level. Thus, 
*q  q  
higher pl 
 
lower pl 
 
I  
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the quality of the physician-patient relationship depends directly on the level of the POMI. In a 
one-to-many interaction, this conclusion still holds but only in a qualified way. When the 
physician cannot observe an individual patient’s information level, it is the quality of information 
of the dominant patient type that matters to the physician. In other words, the physician will 
respond to an increase or decrease in the accuracy of the dominant patients but she will not 
respond to a change in the level of information of other patients, unless such change switches the 
dominant patient type. So only the information level of the dominant patient type matters.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
Physicians sometimes fail to recommend the treatment option most desirable for a patient with a 
specific condition. As many as one-third of physicians “sometimes,” “often,” or “very often” do 
not offer a useful service to a patient because of health plan rules [42]. Not surprisingly, 
physicians whose own rewards were closely tied to controlling costs were more likely to 
withhold information. Beyond the financial, other concerns may further distort physicians’ 
interests away from that of the patient, for example, if, from the physician’ a patient requires an 
undue amount of physician time the physician may not supply all the information a patient 
demands. Partly to arm themselves, patients are increasingly using computer-mediated tools to 
gather information about their condition.  
 
Our study confirms that higher POMI level helps improve the physician-patient interaction, or 
the patient-centered medical system and the shared decision making model we envision as the 
direction of the 21st century healthcare system [43]. Together with our efforts to align 
physicians’ incentives with patients’ objectives, we should spare no effort to provide high quality 
medical information to the public to shape the patient-physician relationship. While we may 
never eliminate the information asymmetry or conflict of interests between the patient and the 
physician, informing the patients can definitely help our efforts to create a quality, equality 
healthcare system. 
 
While our study and several other studies suggest that POMI helps create a patient-centered 
healthcare system in which physicians and patients share the decision-making [44, 45], we know 
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that access to outside medical information is linked to patient’s socioeconomic status [16-18]. 
Those with poorer socioeconomic status usually have less access to information, and have less 
ability to understand and use such information in the medical encounter [22-24]. So as a society 
armed with the powerful tool of POMI in reshaping the physician-patient interaction, how do we 
use such tool to decrease or eliminate the persistent healthcare disparities among different 
socioeconomic groups [46-50]?  
 
Our study suggests that when the physician cannot distinguish the information level of individual 
patients within the same population, every patient may be treated by the same way regardless of 
his information level. The physician may respond only to change in the overall information 
structure of the population, not to change in information level of a particular patient. So 
individual patients of a certain socioeconomic group may find themselves in a situation where 
they cannot change the behavior of their physicians even if they try to become more informed. 
This is evident as empirical studies show that there exist wide-spread disparities in access and 
utilization of health care among patients with different socioeconomic characteristics [46-50].  
 
To help alleviate or even eliminate the disparities in healthcare among different socioeconomic 
groups using POMI, we should target efforts towards different subgroups within a population 
depending on the existing information structure of the population. For example, our study 
suggests that when the low information level is the dominant one (e.g., for patient population 
with low socioeconomic status), the most effective way to enhance information transmission and 
patient welfare is to increase the ratio of highly informed patient so that a “regime change” 
occurs. Efforts to increase the information level of those already informed would have no impact 
at all. On the other hand, when the high information level is the dominant one (e.g., for patient 
population with high socioeconomic status), the most effective way to enhance information 
transmission and patient welfare is to increase the information level of those already informed. 
Efforts to increase the information level of those not informed within such population would 
have no impact at all.  
 
Given the fact that patients of lower socioeconomic status are in a disadvantaged position as to 
access to understandable information, we should focus our resources and efforts to provide 
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understandable medical information to those patient groups so that enough patients become 
informed to cause “regime change”. Increasing the health literacy and the portion of informed 
patients in the lower socioeconomic group will likely to help all patients within this group, since 
when the portion of informed patients in a population is low, an increase in information level 
will improve the welfare of all patients in this group. So the most effective way to utilize POMI 
as a tool to address the healthcare disparity issue is to focus on those groups with the least access 
and/or ability to understand medical information.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank two anonymous referees for their comments. We also thank participants of the 4th 
iHEA conference in San Francisco for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Mythreyi 
Bhargavan, Kris De Jaegher, and Jeff Rubin for their comments. 
 36
Appendix 
 
Notation 
 
As in the text, we denote by pii(t) the probability that a patient of type i∈{h,l} accepts 
recommendation t∈{A,B}. Denote by )|( tsiµ  the probability that a patient of type i assigns to 
being in state s upon receiving a treatment recommendation t. If treatment t,is prescribed with 
positive probability, we have: 
)|()1()|(
)|()|( βpiαpi
αpi
αµ
tptp
tp
t
ii
i
i
−+
=  and 
)|()1()|(
)|()1()|( βpiαpi
βpiβµ
tptp
tp
t
ii
i
i
−+
−
=  
If a treatment option is not on the equilibrium path, then a Bayesian equilibrium permits the 
patient to hold any beliefs. Further, denote by )(tU i  the expected utility of a patient of type i 
from accepting treatment t and by )|( stV  the expected utility of the physician from 
recommending treatment t to a patient in state s. These are given by: 
)|()|()|()|()( ββµααµ tuttuttU iii +=  
lh
llhh
pqqp
tpqtqp
tvtV )1(
)()1()()()|(
−+
−+
=
pipi
α  
)1)(1()1(
)()1)(1()()1()()|(
lh
llhh
pqpq
tpqtpq
tvtV
−−+−
−−+−
=
pipiβ  
 
Equilibria Analysis 
 
As discussed in the text, the model permits multiple equilibria. In this section, we enumerate all 
equilibria and demonstrate that the list is exhaustive. In Table A.1, we classify equilibria into 
three categories. Equilibrium C1 (more correctly, a continuum of equilibria when q=q*) is the 
candidate equilibrium analyzed in the text. Equilibria in C2 share a common feature that no 
patient will ever accept any recommendation. Because in this case the physician always receives 
an expected payoff of 0 regardless of which state the patient is in or which option the physician 
recommends, she is always indifferent between recommending two options, so she can choose 
)|( αpi A and )|( βpi B freely as long as such choice does not make any patient better off 
accepting any recommendation than rejecting it. 
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Table 2-A-1 List of equilibria 
Physician Strategy Patient Strategy 
Equilibrium 
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Equilibria in C3 share a common feature that only option A is recommended. Because patients’ 
prior beliefs are that option A yields positive utility, both types of patients will always accept this 
recommendation. To support these equilibria, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs (when option B is 
recommended) must lead to rejection of B with high enough probability. First, we establish as a 
lemma a condition on the equilibrium. 
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium in which both treatment options are recommended with 
positive probability,  
(i) If ∃ },{ lhi ∈ such that )(AU i ≤ 0, then )(Bjpi = 0, },{ lhj ∈ ; 
(ii) If )(AU i > 0, },{ lhi ∈ , then ∃ },{ lhj ∈ such that )(Bjpi > 0. 
Proof: (i) We proceed by contradiction. Assume that )(AU i ≤ 0 for some i but that 
)(Bjpi >0 for some j. First, note that 
)(AU i ≤ 0   )|( Ai αµ < lp  by assumption 2  
   1)|()|( <+ βpiαpi BA  
But, 
)(Bjpi >0  )(BU j ≥ 0 
   )|( Bj βµ ≥ 1- lp  by assumption 2 
   1)|()|( ≥+ βpiαpi BA  
leading to a contradiction. Therefore, )(Bjpi = 0. 
(ii) First, note that, for },{ lhi ∈ , 
)(AU i > 0  )(Aipi =1 
   )|( αAV = )|( βAV = )(Av  
But for B to be recommended with positive probability, ∃ },{ βα∈s such that 
)|( sBV ≥ )|( sAV = )(Av > 0, which implies ∃ },{ lhj ∈ such that )(Bjpi > 0.  
We now proceed to prove the main result of this subsection. 
Proposition A1. Table A.1 contains an exhaustive list of equilibria of the game. 
Proof: We classify possible equilibria into four categories:  
(i) Equilibria in which only treatment B is recommended in equilibrium; 
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(ii) Equilibria in which only treatment A is recommended in equilibrium; 
(iii) Equilibria in which both treatments are recommended with positive probability and 
in which either 0)( ≤AU l  or 0)( ≤AU h  (or both). 
(iv) Equilibria in which both treatments are recommended with positive probability and  
)(AU h , )(AU l > 0. 
We construct equilibria in each category. 
(i) If only treatment B is recommended in equilibrium, then )|( αpi A =0 and )|( βpi B =1. 
)|( αpi A = 0, )|( βpi B = 1  )|( Bi βµ = 1 - ip  
     )(BU i < 0, i∈{h,l}, by assumption 2 
     )(Bipi = 0, i∈{h,l} 
     )|( αBV = 0 
But since )|( αpi A = 0, )|()|( αα BVAV ≤ =0. But for )|( αAV  to equal 0, the probability of 
either type accepting A must be zero; thus )(Aipi = 0. This corresponds to equilibrium C2.2. 
(ii) If only treatment A is recommended in equilibrium, then )|( αpi A = 1, )|( βpi B = 0.
 )|( αpi A = 1, )|( βpi B = 0  )|( Ai αµ = ip  
     )(AU i > 0, i∈{h,l}, by assumption 2 
     )(Aipi = 1, i∈{h,l} 
     )|( αAV = )|( βAV = )(Av  
But since )|( αpi A = 1, it must be true that )|( αBV ≤ )|( αAV = )(Av  and for )|( βpi B = 0, it 
must be true that )|( βBV ≤ )|( βAV = )(Av . These conditions are equivalent to: 
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which corresponds to equilibrium C3. For example, the above is satisfied when 
)(Bhpi ≤ )(Blpi = )(
)(
Bv
Av
 and )(
)(
Bv
Av
, so such equlibria always exist. 
(iii) If )(AU h ≤ 0 or )(AU l ≤ 0, then by Lemma 1, )(Bhpi = )(Blpi = 0. Since neither type accepts 
treatment B, and both options are recommended with positive probability, we have: 
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)|( αBV = )|( βBV = 0 
    )|( αAV = )|( βAV = 0 
    )(Ahpi = )(Alpi = 0   
But, for },{ lhi ∈ , 
)(AU i ≤ 0   )|()|( ααpi AuApi  + ( ) )|()|(1)1( ββpi AuBpi −−  ≤  0                             
)(BU i ≤ 0   ( ) )|()|(1 ααpi BuApi −  + )|()|()1( ββpi BuBpi− ≤ 0                                 
which correspond to equilibrium C2.1. Note that this equilibrium exists since the above 
conditions are satisfied in a neighborhood around )|( αpi A = )|( βpi B =0. 
(iv) By Lemma 1, if )(AU h , )(AU l > 0, then )(Bjpi > 0 for some },{ lhj ∈ . From Proposition 2 
and Corollary 2.2, either: 
 (iv-a) 0≤ )(Bhpi < 1, )(Blpi =1; or 
 (iv-b) )(Bhpi = 0, 1≥ )(Blpi > 0. 
We consider both of these cases. 
(iv-a) If both treatment options are recommended with positive probability then )(AU h >0,  
)(AU l >0, 0≤ )(Bhpi < 1, and )(Blpi =1, imply that 1)()( == AA lh pipi , and 
)(Blpi =1   )(BU l ≥ 0  
  )|()|()1()|()]|(1[ ββpiααpi BuBpBuAp ll −+−  ≥ 0  (A.1) 
)(AU h > 0    )|( αpi A >0  
0≤ )(Bhpi < 1   )(BU h ≤ 0  
  )|()|()1()|()]|(1[ ββpiααpi BuBpBuAp hh −+− ≤ 0 (A.2) 
    )|( αpi A <1 
So 0< )|( αpi A <1 which implies indifference on the part of the physician: 
)|( αBV = )|( αAV   ])1()()[(])1()[( lhhlh pqqpBBvpqqpAv −+=−+ pi  
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for which no solution exists when q<q*. But when q≥q*, )|( βpi B =1 since 
)|()|( ββ AVBV − = [ ][ ])1)(1()1(
)()())(1(
lhh
lh
pqpqp
AvBvppq
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 > 0 
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Substituting into (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain: 
)|()1()|()]|(1[ βααpi BupBuAp ll −+−  ≥ 0 (A.1’) 
)|()1()|()]|(1[ βααpi BupBuAp hh −+− ≤ 0 (A.2’) 
When q>q*, )(Bhpi >0 implies that )(BU h ≥0. But  from above, )(BU h ≤ 0. Thus, )(BU h =0 and 
(A.2’) holds with equality. Since lh pp > , (A.1’) holds with strict inequality. So we have:  
)|( αpi A = )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
h
h−+
  
When q=q*, (A.1’) and (A.2’) require that  
)|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
l
l−+ ≤ )|( αpi A ≤ )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
h
h−+ . 
The above conditions correspond to equilibrium C1 when q≥q*. 
(iv-b) If both treatment options are recommended with positive probability then )(AU h >0, 
)(AU l >0, )(Bhpi =0 and 0< )(Blpi ≤1, imply that 1)()( == AA lh pipi , and 
0< )(Blpi ≤1   )(BU l ≥ 0  
  )|()|()1()|()]|(1[ ββpiααpi BuBpBuAp ll −+− ≥ 0 (A.3) 
)(AU h > 0    )|( αpi A >0, and  
)(Bhpi = 0    )(BU h ≤ 0  
  )|()|()1()|()]|(1[ ββpiααpi BuBpBuAp hh −+− ≤ 0  (A.4) 
    )|( αpi A <1 
So 0< )|( αpi A <1 which implies indifference on the part of the physician: 
)|( αBV = )|( αAV   )()1)((])1()[( BpqBvpqqpAv lllh pi−=−+  
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for which no solution exists when q>q*. But when q≤q*, )|( βpi B =1 since 
)|()|( ββ AVBV −  = [ ])1)(1()1(
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Substituting into (A.3) and (A.4), 
)|()1()|()]|(1[ βααpi BupBuAp ll −+−  ≥ 0    (A.3’) 
)|()1()|()]|(1[ βααpi BupBuAp hh −+− ≤ 0  (A.4’) 
When q<q*, )(Blpi < 1 implies that )(BU l ≤ 0. But from above, )(BU l ≥ 0. Thus, )(BU l = 0 and 
(A.4’) holds with equality. Since lh pp > , (A.4’) holds with strict inequality. So we have:  
)|( αpi A = )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
l
l−+
  
When q=q*, )(Blpi = 0, (A.4’) and (A.5’) require that 
)|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
l
l−+ ≤ )|( αpi A ≤ )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
h
h−+ . 
The above conditions correspond to equilibrium C1 when q≤q*.  
 
Proofs 
 
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, I<1. 
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that .1)|()|( =×= βpiαpi BAI  This 
means that )|( Ai αµ = )|( Bi βµ =1, i∈{h,l}, implying (by Assumption 1) that both types of 
patients will accept either recommendation. But if 1)()( == BA ii pipi , i∈{h,l}, and since 
v(B)>v(A), the physician will always recommend option B. Then, )|( αpi A =0, leading to a 
contradiction.  
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium in which both treatment options are recommended 
with positive probability, we have: 
(i) )(Alpi > 0  )(Ahpi = 1  
(ii) )(Ahpi < 1  )(Alpi  = 0 
(iii)  )(Bhpi > 0  )(Blpi = 1 
(iv) )(Blpi < 1  )(Bhpi = 0. 
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Proof. We demonstrate parts (i) and (ii) as the others are obtained analogously. If 
)(Alpi > 0, the low type patient must weakly prefer accepting recommendation A to rejecting it. 
Since lh pp > , we have: 
)(Alpi > 0  )(AU l ≥ 0  
        ( ) )|()|(1)1()|()|( ββpiααpi AuBpAuAp ll −−+ ≥ 0 
   ( ) )|()|(1)1()|()|( ββpiααpi AuBpAuAp hh −−+ > 0 
   )(AU h > 0 
   )(Ahpi =1 
Note that (ii) is logically equivalent to (i). Analogous arguments demonstrate (iii)-(iv).  
Corollary 2.1. In equilibrium, )()( AA lh pipi ≥ , )()( BB lh pipi ≤ . 
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 2.  
Corollary 2.2. In equilibrium, )(Bhpi < 1.  
Proof. If )(Bhpi = 1, then by Proposition 2, )(Blpi =1. Thus, both patient types accept 
treatment B. Since )()( AvBv > , the physician would always recommend treatment B, which 
would, by Assumption 2, be rejected by both patient types, leading to a contradiction.  
Proposition 3. (C1) is an equilibrium of the patient-physician interaction game. 
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition A1.  
Proposition 4. The candidate equilibrium (equilibrium C1 from Table A.1) is the only 
equilibrium in which the information transmission level I is strictly greater than 0. 
Proof. For equilibria in C2 and C3, I=0. For equilibrium C1, 
I  )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
l
l−+ > 0 
where the first inequality follows from lh pp >  and )|(0)|( αβ BuBu >>  and the second 
inequality follows from Assumption 2.    
Proposition 5.  The physician receives higher expected utility under the candidate 
equilibrium (C1 in Table A.1) than under any other equilibrium. Further, the candidate 
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equilibrium Pareto dominates all other equilibria when 
)|()|()1()|()|()1( αββα BuAuppBuAupp hllh −<− . 
Proof. First, note that in all equilibria in C2, the physician and both types of patients 
receive an expected payoff of 0, while in C1, all players receive positive expected payoffs.  
Denote by E [v] the physician’s expected utility in equilibrium, and by E[ hU ] and E [ lU ] 
the high and low type patients’ expected utilities in equilibrium. We use 1|][ CvE  and 3|][ CvE to 
denote the physician’s expected utility in equilibrium C1 and C3; similarly, 1|][ CiUE  and  
3|][ CiUE  denote the expected utility of a patient of type i in equilibrium C1 and C3. By direct 
computation, we obtain 
1|][ CvE  =  [ ] )|()1()( αpi ApqqpAv lh −+  
        +  [ ])1)(1)(()1()()( llhh pqBpqBBv −−+− pipi  
        +  [ ][ ])|(1)1)(()()( αpipipi ApqBqpBBv llhh −−+  
 =  [ ]lh pqqpAv )1()( −+  + [ ])1)(1)(()1()()( llhh pqBpqBBv −−+− pipi  
 =  








≤


	


 −+
>


	


 −−
+


	


 −+
*
)1()(
*
))(1()()1()(
qq
p
pqqp
Av
qq
p
ppq
Bv
p
pqqpAv
l
lh
h
lh
h
lh
 
 >  )(Av  
 =  3|][ CvE  
Hence the physician receives higher expected utility under C1 than C3. In equilibrium C3, 
patients’ payoffs are given by: 
3|][ CiUE = )|()1()|( βα AupAup ii −+  for },{ lhi ∈ .  
In equilibrium C1, 






<
−
+
>
−
+
=
*)|(
)|()|()1()|(
*)|(
)|()|()1()|(
|][ 1
qq
Bup
AuBupp
Aup
qq
Bup
AuBuppAup
UE
l
il
i
h
ih
i
Ci
α
αβ
α
α
αβ
α
 
and 
)|(
)|()|()1()|(
α
αβ
α
Bup
AuBupp
Aup
l
il
i
−
+  
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   ≤ 1|][ CiUE  ≤  )|(
)|()|()1()|(
α
αβ
α
Bup
AuBupp
Aup
h
ih
i
−
+  
Because lh pp > , we have: 
 
*,1|][ qqCiUE > ≥ *,1|][ qqCiUE = ≥ *,1|][ qqCiUE <   
So we need only to show that 
*,1|][ qqCiUE < > 2|][ CiUE . 
*,1|][ qqCiUE < - 2|][ CiUE =  )|()|(
)|(1)|( α
α
β
α Au
Bu
Bup
p
p
Aup i
l
l
i
−
+ - 
           - )|()1()|( βα AupAup ii −+  
                             =   )|(.
)|()|()|()|(])1()1[(
α
βααβ
Bup
AuBuAuBupppp
l
liil
−
−−−  
which is positive when )|()|()1()|().|()1( αββα BuAuppBuAupp hllh −<− .      
Proposition 6. In the candidate equilibrium, U = [ ]lh pqqpIAu )1()|( −+α . 
 Proof. As we just showed, in the candidate equilibrium, 






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−
+
>
−
+
=
*)|(
)|()|()1()|(
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|][ 1
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and   






<
−
+
>
−
+
=
*)|(
)|()1(1
*)|(
)|()1(1
qq
Bup
Bup
qq
Bup
Bup
I
l
l
h
h
α
β
α
β
  
So:   U = ][)1(][ lh UEqUqE −+  
      = )]|()1()|()[1()]|()1()|([ αααα AupIAupqAupIAupq llhh −+−+−+  
      = ])1([)|( lh pqqpIAu −+α                                                                          
Theorem 1. In equilibrium (C1), 0=
∂
∂
q
I
 when q≠q*. 
Proof: Follows directly from the form of C1.   
Theorem 2. The threshold value q * increases with lp  and decreases with hp .  
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(i) 0* >
∂
∂
lp
q
;  (ii)
hp
q
∂
∂ *
<0. 
Proof: This follows directly from the form of q *=
)]()([)(
)()(
AVBVAV
p
p
BVAV
l
h
−+
−
. 
Theorem 3. In equilibrium (C1),  
(i) 0>
∂
∂
hp
I
 when q > q *;  (ii) 0=
∂
∂
hp
I
 when q < q *’.  
(iii) for small >0, there exists a q<q* such that ε+<< hp
I
hp
I ||  
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow directly from the form of C1.  
 (iii) Define 0)()(* * >+−≡ εδ hh pqpq . Then, there exists a q such that 
** qqq <<−δ .   
Theorem 4. In equilibrium (C1),  
(i) 0>
∂
∂
lp
I
 when q < q *’;  (ii) 0=
∂
∂
lp
I
 when q > q *.   
(iii) for >0, there exists a q>q* such that ε+>> lp
I
lp
I ||  
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow directly from the form of C1.  
(iii) Define 0)()(* * >−+≡ ll pqpq εδ . Then, there exists a q such that δ+<< ** qqq .   
 
Modeling the negotiation between the physician and the patient 
 
In the body of this manuscript, we model the bargaining procedure over treatment options as a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer proposed by the physician. In this section, we discuss more robust 
bargaining models. Traditional models of two-player bargaining assume both continuity of the 
set of possible outcomes and a cost of delay which encourages earlier agreements. For example, 
Rubinstein’s classic model of sequential bargaining considers a division of a pie of unit size, 
with the pie “shrinking” at a predetermined rate after each round of unsuccessful negotiation 
[51]. In our scenario, since bargaining is likely to occur in a span of minutes rather than years, 
discounting is unlikely to be relevant. Instead, we adopt the “uncertain termination” approach of 
Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky in which a rejection of the current proposal implies some 
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positive probability that bargaining will terminate rather than continue into another period [52]. 
This probabilistic termination model is more intuitive in the present context and, in many 
settings, is isomorphic to a model in which the surplus vanishes with time [52].  
 
The discrete set of bargaining outcomes is either treatment A or treatment B. Institutionally, 
there is no ability for the patient and physician to split the surplus through side payments, such as 
through a monetary payment by the physician to the patient in consideration of the patient 
accepting a less desirable treatment option. Further, any such side payments would limit the 
generality of our model as they would require interpersonal comparisons of utility. Instead, we 
“convexify” the set of treatment options by considering that a proposal by the physician is of the 
form )|( αpi A and )|( βpi B ; the physician proposes a probability of treatment A to a patient in 
state α and a probability of treatment B in state .  
 
For concreteness (though quite divorced from reality), we can imagine a computer program 
carrying out the proposal according to the following rules: if the patient accepts a proposal 
{ )|( αpi A , )|( βpi B }, the physician inputs the patient’s state and the proposal into the computer 
program. The computer then recommends a treatment option according to the proposal and the 
patient’s state. By accepting a proposal, the patient also commits himself to accepting any 
recommendation that is a result of such proposal. More realistically, envision the physician 
sharing her “treatment philosophy” prior to examining the patient: “For patients who exhibit 
conditions similar to yours, I usually (e.g., with some known probability) suggest treatment A or 
B.” 
 
We construct an infinite horizon one-sided offer bargaining model with incomplete information. 
In each period, t, the physician proposes a probability pair { )|( αpi At , )|( βpi Bt }. A patient of 
type },{ lhi ∈  accepts the proposal with probability tiAcc . If it is accepted, the implemented 
treatment option (A or B) is randomly drawn according to the probability )|( αpi A  or )|( βpi B  
corresponding to the patient’s state. If the offer is rejected, bargaining terminates with 
probability . With complementary probability 1-, the physician makes another offer in the 
following period. The termination probability  represents the chance of breakdown in 
negotiations; either the physician or the patient may find such seesaw negotiations awkward or 
costly and decide to end further bargaining. This model is a (simple) instance of the sequential 
bargaining with one-sided incomplete information model of Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere 
[53], to which we refer the reader for a more general discussion. In what follows, we solve for 
the equilibria of this model.  
 
Denote the history of the game through period t-1 by 
{ } 11),|(),|( −== tit AccBAh ττττ βpiαpi . 
We concentrate on stationary equilibria of this model in which a player’s strategy depends only 
on whether or not an acceptance has occurred, and not on the period, t. For the patient, since an 
acceptance implies the end of the game, his strategy is independent of history. The physician’s 
strategy, on the other hand, is independent of t but may take on a different value if the patient has 
previously rejected an offer. Thus, an equilibrium strategy for the physician may be denoted by 
the four-tuple: { )|(1 αpi A , )|(1 βpi B , )|(2 αpi A , )|(2 βpi B }, in which { )|(1 αpi A , )|(1 βpi B } is 
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the offer in period 1, and { )|(2 αpi A , )|(2 βpi B } is the offer in all subsequent periods (t>1) if 
previous offers have been rejected.  
 
Denote )]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAU i  as the expected utility a type i patient receives when he accept 
proposal { )|( αpi A , )|( βpi B }, )]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAVi as the expected utility the physician 
receives from type i patient when the patient accept proposal { )|( αpi A , )|( βpi B }, and 
)]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAV as the expected utility the physician receives when both types of patients 
accept proposal )]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAV . Obviously: 
 
 )]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAU i = )|()|()1()|()|( ββpiααpi BuBpAuAp ii −+ + 
    )|()]|(1[)|()]|(1)[1( ααpiββpi BuApAuBp ii −+−−  
  
 )]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAVi = 
 )]}()()[|()(){1()]}()()[|()({ AvBvBAvpBvAvABvp ii −+−+−+ βpiαpi    and 
  
 )]|(),|([ βpiαpi BAV = )]|(),|([)1()]|(),|([ βpiαpiβpiαpi BAVqBAqV lh −+ . 
 
The following proposition characterizes the unique stationary equilibrium: 
 
Proposition A.4.1. 
 
Define q**= ]1),|([]1),|([]1),|([
]1),|([]1),|([
*1
*1
αpiαpiαpiλ
αpiαpi
AVAVAV
AVAV
h
ll
h
h
h
ll
−+
−
 where  
)|( αpi Ah  = )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
h
h−+
 and  
)|(*1 αpi A = )]|()|([
)]|()|([)|()|()1(
αα
αββλαpiλ
BuAup
BuBupBu
A
l
lh
−
−−
−− , then the following is a unique 
stationary equilibrium of the model: 
(i) if q < q**: 
 
)|(1 αpi A  =  =)|(2 αpi A  )|( αpi Ah   
 
1)|()|( 21 == βpiβpi BB  
 
1=tiAcc },{, hlit ∈∀  
 
(ii) if q > q**:  
 
)|(1 αpi A  =  )]|()|([
)]|()|([)|()|()1(
αα
αββλαpiλ
BuAup
BuBupBu
A
l
lh
−
−−
−−  
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=)|(2 αpi A )|( αpi Ah  
 
1)|()|( 21 == βpiβpi BB  
 
1=tlAcc t∀ , 01 =hAcc , 1=thAcc 1>t  
 
We note several features of the equilibrium. First, similar to the equilibrium discussed in the text, 
its nature depends on a threshold value of q (i.e., q**). When λ =1, and thus negotiations do not 
last past one period, q** corresponds to the q* defined in the text. Second, the physician’s 
strategy is similar in this infinite horizon model as in the take-it-or-leave-it model discussed in 
the text in that she basically chooses between two possible strategies to maximize her expected 
utility. Thus, the equilibrium of this model resembles that of the simple model in the text. 
However, this model also opens the possibility to screening. When the ratio of well-informed 
patients is above a critical value, the physician plans on making two offers. The first is less 
advantageous but is accepted by the less informed. If rejected, the physician is aware that the 
patient is more informed and offers a better (from the patient’s perspective) treatment option. 
Whether such screening is occurring in practice is an empirical question that deserves of future 
research efforts. 
 
The rest of this section develops several lemmas to prove the above proposition. 
 
Lemma A.4.1. In a stationary equilibrium, a patient will accept within the first two periods. 
Proof: Suppose { }titt AccbBA ),|(),|( piαpi  is an equilibrium and consider a period t>1 such that 
a patient of type i has rejected previous offers. If a patient rejects the physician’s offers { })|(),|( bBA tt piαpi  in period t, the physician earns 0, since the same offer will exist in all 
future periods (by definition of a stationary equilibrium). However, the physician can offer 
)|()|( ** βpiαpi BA tt = =1 which the patient will accept (since it yields maximal possible 
payoffs), and which results in positive payoffs for the physician. Thus a { })|(),|( bBA tt piαpi , 
t>1 which is rejected cannot be part of an equilibrium.  
 
Corollary A.4.1. In a stationary equilibrium, a type l patient will accept in the first period.  
Proof: By contradiction. If both types were to reject in period 1 and (by Lemma A.4.1) accept in 
period 2, then letting )|()|( 21 αpiαpi AA = and )|()|( 21 βpiβpi BB = , that is, changing the first 
period offer to be the same as the second period offer, will lead both types to accept in period 1, 
yielding higher payoffs for the physician. Lastly, by construction, if a low type rejects an offer 
then so will a high type, implying that the low type must accept in period 1. 
 
Lemma A.4.2. In a stationary equilibrium, )|( βpi Bt =1 for all t. 
Proof: By construction, the patient’s utility function is increasing in )|( βpi Bt . Also, as long as 
one type of patient accepts, they physician’s utility function is increasing in )|( βpi Bt . Suppose 
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in equilibrium that for some period τ , )|( βpi τ B <1. Consider an alternate physician strategy 
where )|(ˆ bBtpi = )|( bBtpi  for all τ≠t , and 1)|(ˆ =bBτpi .  
The patient is not less likely to accept and the physician earns a higher payoff. Thus, 
)|( βpi τ B <1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.    
 
Lemma A.4.3. In a stationary equilibrium, if both types do not accept in period 1, then 
)]|([ 1 αpi AU l = )]|([)1( 2 αpiλ AU l− . 
Proof: (i) Suppose )]|([ 1 αpi AU l > )]|([)1( 2 αpiλ AU l− . Then there exists an ε  such that 
])|([ 1 εαpi −AU l > )]|([)1( 2 αpiλ AU l− ; the physician can lower the offer a little bit and still 
have type l patients accept, but resulting in a higher payoff for the physician.  
(ii) Suppose )]|([ 1 αpi AU l < )]|([)1( 2 αpiλ AU l− . Then, a type l patient rejects )|(1 αpi A in 
round 1 and accepts )|(2 αpi A in round 2, contradicting Corollary A.4.1.    
 
Next, denote by  
)|( αpi Ah  = )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
h
h−+ , and 
)|( αpi Al  = )|(
)|()1(1
α
β
Bu
Bu
p
p
l
l−+
 
the offers that result in type h and type l patients earning a payoff of zero if accepted. 
 
Lemma A.4.4.  In a stationary equilibrium:  
(i) )|()|(1 αpiαpi AA l≥  
(ii) )|(2 αpi A = )|( αpi Ah . 
Proof: (i). Follows from Corollary A.4.1 since a low type must find the offer acceptable. 
(ii). An offer of )|(2 αpi A  implies that a rejection occurred in period 1. By Corollary A.4.1, only 
the high type patient rejected the first offer. Thus, )|( αpi Ah  places a minimum bound on offers 
acceptable in period 2. Any higher offer would also be accepted but yield a lower payoff for the 
physician.    
 
Thus, two possibilities exist. Either both types of patients accept in period 1, or only low types 
accept in period 1 and high types accept in period 2. The first period offer is 
)|(1 αpi A = )|( αpi Ah . In the latter case, Lemma A.4.3. implies a first period offer of 
 
)|(*1 αpi A = )]|()|([
)]|()|([)|()|()1(
αα
αββλαpiλ
BuAup
BuBupBu
A
l
lh
−
−−
−−   (A.4-1) 
 
The physician effectively selects between these two strategies depending on which maximizes 
her payoffs. 
 
Lemma A.4.5. In a stationary equilibrium, both types will accept in period 1 if and only if: 
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]1),|([ αpi AV h ]1),|([)1(]1),|([)1( *1 αpiλαpi AVqAVq hhl −+−≥ .  (A.4-2) 
Proof: Suppose ]1),|([ αpi AV h < ]1),|([)1(]1),|([)1( *1 αpiλαpi AVqAVq hhl −+−  and both types 
accept in period 1. But then an offer of )|(*1 αpi A  in period 1 and )|( αpi Ah  in period 2 would 
result in a higher payoff.   
 
Equation (A.4-2) may be rewritten in terms of q. The game will end in the first round if: 
q > ]1),|([]1),|([]1),|([
]1),|([]1),|([
*1
*1
αpiαpiαpiλ
αpiαpi
AVAVAV
AVAV
h
ll
h
h
h
ll
−+
−
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition A.4.1: follows from Lemmas A.4.1 to A.4.5.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Introduction 
 
Patients are increasingly seeking medical information from the Internet and other sources [1-3], 
and several studies show that such patient or consumer-obtained medical information (POMI) 
has impact on the amount of healthcare services used by the patients. For example, Kenkel found 
that more informed patients have more physician visits [4]. In a survey to physicians, Murray et 
al. found that when patients brought information to the physicians and wanted a change in 
medication, many physicians usually did what the patients wanted, either completely (23%) or 
partially (59%) [5].  
 
This suggests that a patient with medical information from sources other than his* physician (i.e., 
with POMI) may use more healthcare services and more resources than patients without such 
information. But given the persistent disparities in healthcare utilization among patients of 
different socioeconomic groups [6-10] and the fact that patients with POMI have different 
socioeconomic status than those without POMI [11], there are important questions about the 
relationship between POMI and healthcare utilization that are not addressed by existing studies. 
For example, are the healthcare disparities among different socioeconomic groups caused by 
differences in information seeking behaviors of these groups (i.e., can we change utilization level 
of certain patients by changing their information level)? Or is it the other way around, that 
differences in utilization between more informed patients and lesser informed ones are just a 
reflection of their differences in socioeconomic characteristics (i.e., as long as a patient’s 
socioeconomic characteristics do not change, changing his POMI level has no impact on his 
utilization)?  
 
Answers to these questions have important implications to efforts to alleviate or even eliminate 
the persistent disparities in healthcare utilization among different socioeconomic groups [6-10] 
and the persistent variances in healthcare utilization among different regions [12-20]. For 
                                                 
*
 For convenience, we assume that a patient is a male and a physician a female in this paper. 
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example, if changing the disparities/variances in information levels can change the 
disparities/variances in healthcare utilization across population groups or geographic regions, 
then we may well achieve such goals as a result of our efforts to create a patient-centered 
healthcare system [21-25] with shared decision making between patients and their providers [26-
28]. Then, our vision about the power of Internet [29-30] and the shared decision making model 
[26-28] does hold the key to a better healthcare system for the 21st century as IOM and others 
envisioned [29, 31].  
 
In this study, we address these questions by investigating the relationship between POMI and 
healthcare utilization at both the individual level and the regional (county) level. We first 
confirmed that a patient with POMI receives higher usage of healthcare services than a patient 
without POMI, even if these patients are at the same level of health conditions. This imbalance 
seems to be consistent in different services, as we found it in all ten services analyzed. We then 
investigate the change in per capita healthcare services usage in counties when more patients are 
obtaining POMI. Interestingly, we found that although counties with higher portion of patients 
with POMI tend to have higher per capita usage levels, the trend is not monotonic; there seems to 
exist stepwise effects. Per capita usage seems to remain at the same level as the portion of 
patients with POMI increases, until the portion reaches a critical value at which point per capita 
usage increases suddenly.  
 
Methods 
 
Data Sources And Sample Selection 
 
Individual patients’ sources of information and healthcare utilization data were obtained from the 
2000-2001 Community Tracking Study (CTS) Household Survey, a biannual nationally 
representative telephone survey of the civilian, non-institutionalized families and individuals 
(total sample size of 59,725 people in 1226 counties) in the U.S. conducted by the Center for 
Studying Health System Change. Individual patient’s demographic, socioeconomic, general 
health condition and insurance coverage data were also obtained from this survey. 
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Individual data were then aggregated to the county level by FIPS (Federal Information 
Processing Standards, by US Census Bureau) code. In a total of 1226 counties, those counties 
with 15 or more samples were selected, yielding a total of 41,485 individuals in 306 counties. 
Per capita utilization data were obtained by averaging individual utilization in each county, a 
practice frequently used in the literature [32]. For example, if there are 300 patients in the 
individual data with the same FIPS code, these 300 patients are aggregated into one record in the 
aggregate file, and the per capita utilization in that record was calculated by averaging the 
utilization rates of these 300 patients. 
 
Healthcare resource data for these 306 counties were obtained from The 2003 Area Resource 
File (ARF), a database containing 6,289 healthcare related variables for each county in the US. It 
also uses the FIPS code to specify county code. Number of hospital beds and number of active 
MDs per 1000 population in each county were used in our analysis as they were shown to be 
associated with utilization [43]. 
 
Healthcare Service Utilization 
 
We used ten different services in four categories (physician or other specialist visits, surgery 
rates, hospital stays and emergency room visits) as indicators of healthcare usage. These services 
are among the most widely used in utilization studies [32-36]. Table 3-1 shows these ten 
variables. Note that to protect patients’ privacy, extraordinary large numbers were top coded 
(i.e., any number larger than the top code was coded as the top code). 
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Table 3-1 Health service variables 
Table 3-1: Health service variables (in the last 12 months) 
Variable Note Mean (SD) Top code 
      
DRVISNX  Number of times seen a doctor (exclude in ER) 3.979 (5.23) 30 
MPVISNX 
Number of times seen a nurse practitioner, physician  
assistant, or midwife (excluding doctor visits) 0.399 (1.44) 13 
      
SURGNX Number of times had surgery 0.212 (0.56) 5 
SURGOPX Total number of outpatient surgeries 0.151 (0.47) 5 
      
HSPNITX Number of nights spent in hospital 0.526 (2.10) 15 
HSPNODX Number of hospital stays excluding baby delivery 0.140 (1.44) 5 
HSPSTYN Number of times stay in hospital overnight or longer 0.161 (0.62) 5 
      
TOTERX Total number emergency room visits 0.369 (0.90) 7 
ERUSENX Number of times went to a hospital ER room 0.288 (0.79) 7 
HSPERX Number of times admitted to a hospital through ER  0.084 (0.38) 5 
 
Statistic Analysis 
 
For descriptive analyses,  tests were used to compare demographic, socioeconomic and 
insurance coverage characteristics between patients with POMI and those without. Consistent 
with common practice in the literature [37-38], continuous variables such as income and age 
were categorized into categorical variables. Considering large sample size as well as a high 
number of comparisons, statistical significance for these comparisons was set at .001, reducing 
the Meehl effect [39] and the likelihood of chance significance. All p-values were 2-sided.  
 
For relationships between POMI and utilizations, various tests were performed in two levels (the 
individual level and the county level). In the individual level, t-tests were used to compare the 
mean utilizations of all ten services of patients with POMI and patients without POMI in each 
general health condition level since utilizations are continuous variables and the independent 
variable is a dichotomous variable [40]. The level of general health condition for a patient was 
obtained using the self-reported general health condition variable (excellent, very good, good, 
fair, poor) in the CTS survey. Since studies showed that patients with POMI have different 
demographic, socioeconomic and insurance coverage status with patients without POMI [11] and 
that there exist disparities in healthcare utilization among patients with different socioeconomic 
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characteristics [6-10], partial correlation analysis was used to see if the relationship between 
utilization and POMI persists after controlling for these socioeconomic, demographic and 
insurance coverage variables. Statistical significance for individual level analysis was set at .01, 
with all p-value 2-sided. 
  
In the county level, because utilizations and portion of patients with POMI (Q_RATIO) are 
continuous variables, partial correlation analysis were used to establish the relationship between 
per capita utilizations of the ten services and Q_RATIO in the 306 counties, controlling for 
demographic, socioeconomic and insurance coverage characteristics of a county population and 
number of hospital beds and number of active MDs per 1000 population in a county [40]. Given 
the sample size (306), statistical significance for the analyses was set at .05 (all p-values were 2-
sided).  
 
As theoretical studies predict nonlinearity in the aggregate level relationship between POMI and 
utilization [49], binary variables representing different levels of Q_RATIO were used in multiple 
regression analysis [41] for those services that achieved statistical significance in the partial 
correlation analysis to account for possible nonlinearity in the relationship between Q_RATIO 
and per capita utilizations in the county level [40].  
 
To further investigate the nonlinearity in the relationship between Q_RATIO and per capita 
utilizations, the continuous independent variable Q_RATIO was transformed into an ordinal 
variable and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare means of per capital 
utilizations of different Q_RATIO groups [42]. Criteria for the categorical definitions of 
Q_RATIO were chosen so that the categories would divide the study population into groups of 
approximately the same number of counties and that the intervals between cut-off values were 
roughly the same. Because of the small number of counties with very low or very high 
Q_RATIO, counties with Q_RATIO less than 0.30 were categorized in one group, as were 
counties with Q_RATIO larger than 0.50.  
 
All analyses were performed with SPSS, Version 13 (SPSS Inc, Chicago, Ill). 
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Results 
 
Patient’s Sources Of Medical Information 
 
Most studies on POMI tend to focus on the Internet [44-48]. But as shown in the 2000-2001 CTS 
Household Survey and Figure 3.1 below, most patients are still acquiring POMI from more 
traditional sources such as books/magazines and friends/relatives. The survey asked individuals 
if they had sought medical information during the last 12 months from seven sources other than 
their physicians (the Internet, friends or relatives, TV or radio, books or magazines, somewhere 
else other than their doctors, healthcare professionals other than their doctors, healthcare 
organizations). Of all the total 41485 individuals, 25189 (60.7%) never sought medical 
information from such sources, 16296 (39.3%) sought medical information from at least one of 
these sources. Of these 16296 individuals, 9992 (61%) used books/magazines, 8342 (51%) used 
friends/relatives, 7190 (44%) used the Internet, 4755 (29%) used TV/Radio, and few (less than 
3%) used other sources for POMI. The survey shows that about 17% of the US population used 
the Internet for health related information in 2000, comparable with similar surveys [48]. 
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Figure 3.1 Information seeking behavior and information sources 
 
Characteristics Of Patients With POMI 
 
Table 3-2 shows the demographic, socioeconomic and insurance coverage characteristics of 
patients with POMI and those without POMI. It can be seen from this table that patients who 
actively seek POMI are on average younger, less healthy, have higher family income, spent more 
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years in school, and are more likely to be female, insured and white than patients who rely solely 
on their physicians for medical information. Such characteristic differences are comparable with 
other studies [11]. 
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Table 3-2 Characteristics of the whole CTS sample, patients who actively sought medical 
information and patients who did not sought medical information 
    
Patients who actively 
sought medical info
Patients who did not
 seek medical info
Whole 
CTS sample
   % % %
Gender       
  Female 60.9 51.3 55.1
  Chi-Square 369.7 (df=1, sig. <0.001)  
Ethnicity     
  White 78.8 76.7 77.5
  Black 11.3 12.6 12.1
  Other 9.9 10.7 10.4
  Chi-Square 31.0 (df=2, sig. <0.001)  
Age (years)       
  <=21 3.7 4.3 4.0
  21-34 23.0 23.0 23.0
  35-49 34.6 32.5 33.3
  50-64 23.7 22.0 22.7
  65-74 9.2 10.5 10.0
  >= 75 5.9 7.8 7.0
  Chi-Square 103.8 (df=5, sig. <0.001)  
  Mean (SD) 46.1 (16.2) 46.7 (17.3) 46.5 (16.9)
Household income ($)     
  <25,000 27.9 33.0 31.0
  25000-49999 27.0 29.1 28.2
  50000-74999 24.0 21.9 22.7
  >=75000 21.1 16.0 18.0
  Chi-Square 259.6 (df=3, sig. <0.001)  
  Mean  49524 43858 46083
Education (years)       
  <=12 39.1 55.1 48.8
  13-16 46.5 37.0 40.7
  >16 14.5 7.9 10.5
  Chi-Square 1138.3 (df=2, sig. <0.001)  
Health Status     
  Excellent 17.3 21.8 20.0
  Very good 36.4 37.2 36.9
  Good 28.3 26.1 27.0
  Fair 13.7 11.3 12.3
  Poor 4.4 3.6 3.9
  Chi-Square 180.8 (df=4, sig. <0.001)  
Residency       
  Urban 70.0 68.9 69.3
  Nonurban 30.0 31.1 30.7
  Chi-Square 5.9 (df=1, sig. = 0.015)  
Insurance coverage     
  Insured 89.7 87.1 88.1
  Uninsured 10.3 12.9 11.9
  Chi-Square 63.7 (df=1, sig. <0.001)  
Total respondents 16296 25189 41485
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Differences In Healthcare Services Usage Of Patients With POMI And Without 
POMI 
 
Comparison of means of ten services is presented in Table 3-3. Table 3-3 shows that there was a 
trend in the direction of those with POMI having higher utilization for all ten services than 
patients without POMI of the same general health condition level, although this trend was not 
universally statistically significant for all services and/or general health condition levels. For 
example, patients with POMI had statistically significantly higher number of surgeries than 
patients without POMI at all five general health condition levels, while there were statistically 
significant differences between patients with POMI and patients without POMI on number of 
nights spent at hospital only at the excellent health condition level. 
 
Table 3-3 Usage by patients with POMI and patients without POMI 
Table 3-3a Usage by patients with POMI and patients without POMI   
      # of Surgeries # of Outpatient Surgeries   
              
    
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
(95% CI) P Value  
Mean
(95% CI) P Value  
Excellent health           
  w POMI 2812 0.18 (0.16-0.19)    0.14 (0.12-0.15)    
  w/o POMI 5492 0.11 (0.10-0.12) <0.001  0.09 (0.08-0.10) <0.001  
Very good health           
  w POMI 5937 0.22 (0.21-0.23)   0.17 (0.16-0.18)   
  w/o POMI 9632 0.16 (0.15-0.17) <0.001  0.09 (0.08-0.10) <0.001  
Good health             
  w POMI 4606 0.28 (0.26-0.30)    0.20 (0.19-0.22)    
  w/o POMI 6578 0.21 (0.19-0.22) <0.001  0.14 (0.13-0.15) <0.001  
Fair health             
  w POMI 2227 0.35 (0.32-0.38)   0.23 (0.21-0.26)   
  w/o POMI 2855 0.26 (0.24-0.29) <0.001  0.17 (0.15-0.19) <0.001  
Poor health             
  w POMI 714 0.48 (0.42-0.55)    0.27 (0.22-0.32)    
  w/o POMI 902 0.39 (0.34-0.45) 0.04  0.23 (0.18-0.27) 0.21  
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Table 3-3b Usage by patients with POMI and patients without POMI   
      # of Hospital ER visits # of ER visits   
              
    
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
(95% CI) P Value  
Mean
(95% CI) P Value  
Excellent health           
  w POMI 2812 0.16 (0.15-0.17)    0.22 (0.20-0.25)    
  w/o POMI 5492 0.11 (0.10-0.12) 0.048  0.19 (0.17-0.20) 0.005  
Very good health           
  w POMI 5937 0.24 (0.22-0.25)   0.28 (0.26-0.30)   
  w/o POMI 9632 0.20 (0.19-0.21) <0.001  0.24 (0.23-0.26) <0.001  
Good health             
  w POMI 4606 0.36 (0.34-0.39)    0.45 (0.42-0.47)    
  w/o POMI 6578 0.29 (0.28-0.31) <0.001  0.38 (0.35-0.40) <0.001  
Fair health             
  w POMI 2227 0.54 (0.49-0.59)   0.72 (0.67-0.77)   
  w/o POMI 2855 0.43 (0.40-0.47) 0.001  0.60 (0.56-0.64) 0.001  
Poor health             
  w POMI 714 0.90 (0.79-1.02)    1.32 (1.19-1.46)    
  w/o POMI 902 0.68 (0.59-0.76) 0.002  1.05 (0.95-1.16) 0.002  
         
 
        
         
Table 3-3c Usage by patients with POMI and patients without POMI   
      # of Hosp Adm. Through ER  # of Nights Spent in Hospital   
              
    
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
(95% CI) P Value  
Mean
(95% CI) P Value  
Excellent health           
  w POMI 2812 0.04 (0.03-0.05)    0.27 (0.22-0.32)    
  w/o POMI 5492 0.03 (0.02-0.03) 0.01  0.17 (0.14-0.20) <0.001  
Very good health           
  w POMI 5937 0.04 (0.04-0.05)   0.30 (0.26-0.33)   
  w/o POMI 9632 0.04 (0.04-0.05) 0.862  0.27 (0.25-0.30) 0.277  
Good health             
  w POMI 4606 0.09 (0.08-0.10)    0.58 (0.52-0.64)    
  w/o POMI 6578 0.08 (0.08-0.09) 0.657  0.56 (0.51-0.61) 0.639  
Fair health             
  w POMI 2227 0.18 (0.16-0.20)   1.05 (0.93-1.18)   
  w/o POMI 2855 0.17 (0.15-0.19) 0.367  1.04 (0.93-1.16) 0.853  
Poor health             
  w POMI 714 0.46 (0.39-0.54)    2.74 (2.39-3.10)    
  w/o POMI 902 0.41 (0.35-0.47) 0.254  2.39 (2.09-2.69) 0.137  
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Table 3-3d Usage by patients with POMI and patients without POMI   
      # of Hospital Stays # of Hospital Stays Overnight   
              
    
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
(95% CI) P Value  
Mean
(95% CI) P Value  
Excellent health           
  w POMI 2812 0.07 (0.05-0.08)    0.10 (0.08-0.11)    
  w/o POMI 5492 0.04 (0.04-0.05) <0.001  0.06 (0.05-0.07) <0.001  
Very good health           
  w POMI 5937 0.09 (0.08-0.10)   0.11 (0.10-0.12)   
  w/o POMI 9632 0.07 (0.07-0.08) 0.01  0.09 (0.08-0.10) 0.035  
Good health             
  w POMI 4606 0.16 (0.15-0.18)    0.18 (0.16-0.19)    
  w/o POMI 6578 0.14 (0.13-0.16) 0.043  0.16 (0.14-0.17) 0.043  
Fair health             
  w POMI 2227 0.30 (0.27-0.33)   0.33 (0.29-0.37)   
  w/o POMI 2855 0.28 (0.25-0.30) 0.275  0.30 (0.27-0.33) 0.281  
Poor health             
  w POMI 714 0.70 (0.61-0.78)    0.79 (0.67-0.92)    
  w/o POMI 902 0.62 (0.55-0.70) 0.201  0.68 (0.58-0.78) 0.147  
         
         
Table 3-3e Usage by patients with POMI and patients without POMI   
      # of Nurse Practioner Visits # of Physician Visits   
              
    
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
(95% CI) P Value  
Mean
(95% CI) P Value  
Excellent health           
  w POMI 2812 0.31 (0.27-0.35)    3.03 (2.88-3.18)    
  w/o POMI 5492 0.19 (0.17-0.21) <0.001  2.05 (1.97-2.13) <0.001  
Very good health           
  w POMI 5937 0.44 (0.41-0.48)   3.88 (3.77-3.99)   
  w/o POMI 9632 0.30 (0.27-0.32) <0.001  2.91 (2.83-2.98) <0.001  
Good health             
  w POMI 4606 0.31 (0.27-0.35)    5.18 (5.01-5.34)    
  w/o POMI 6578 0.19 (0.17-0.21) <0.001  3.83 (3.71-3.94) <0.001  
Fair health             
  w POMI 2227 0.71 (0.63-0.80)   7.07 (6.77-7.37)   
  w/o POMI 2855 0.49 (0.43-0.56) <0.001  5.28 (5.05-5.52) <0.001  
Poor health             
  w POMI 714 1.24 (1.01-1.46)    11.25 (10.54-11.96)    
  w/o POMI 902 0.91 (0.73-1.08) 0.02  7.95 (7.44-8.47) <0.001  
 
The results shown in Table 3-3 should be interpreted with caution because they are unadjusted. 
Partial correlation analyses (Table 3-4) showed that these differences in utilization between 
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patients with and without POMI were partially explained by demographic and socioeconomic 
factors, although a statistically significant linear association between utilizations and POMI 
persisted even after adjustment for these demographic and socioeconomic factors. 
 
Table 3-4 Correlation between utilization and POMI before and after controlling for 
demographic and socioeconomic factors 
 
Service Unadjusted correlation Partial Correlation
# of Physician Visits 0.135 (p<0.001) 0.099 (p<0.001)
# of Nurse Practioner Visits 0.064 (p<0.001) 0.049 (p<0.001)
# of Surgeries 0.066 (p<0.001) 0.051 (p<0.001)
# of Outpatient Surgeries 0.060 (p<0.001) 0.047 (p<0.001)
# of Nights Spent in Hospital 0.022 (p<0.001) 0.013 (p=0.008)
# of Hospital Stays 0.032 (p<0.001) 0.024 (p<0.001)
# of Overnight Hospital Stays 0.031 (p<0.001) 0.021 (p<0.001)
# of ER visits 0.048 (p<0.001) 0.042 (p<0.001)
# of Hospital ER visits 0.046 (p<0.001) 0.041 (p<0.001)
# of Hospital Admission through ER 0.019 (p<0.001) 0.014 (p=0.003)
Sample Size   41485
 
Portion Of Patients With POMI In A County And Per Capita Utilization In That 
County 
 
Tables 3-3 and 3-4 show that there exists statistically significant relationship between utilization 
and POMI at the individual level. Our interest is to find out if such individual level relationship 
still exists at the county level, and if so, if there exists some non-linearity at the county level 
relationship [49].  
 
To see what happens to the amount of healthcare services usage in a county when more patients 
are seeking medical information from sources other than their physicians, we aggregated the 
individual data to the county level. We define Q_RATIO as the portion of individuals in a county 
who actively seek medical information from sources other than their physicians (for example, if 
there are 300 samples in a county, and 100 has POMI, then Q_RATIO of this county would be 
33.3.3%), and it ranges from 9% to 71%, with a mean of 37.5% and a median of 37.5% after 
aggregation. Per capita utilization data were calculated as the average utilization of every county 
for all ten services [32]. 
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Table 3.5 presents the results of ten partial correlation analysis between per capita utilization and 
Q_RATIO after controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and number of hospital beds and 
number of active MDs per 1000 population in each county. Results show that among the ten 
services, five (DRVISNX—Number of doctor visits; MPVISNX—Number of nurse practitioner, 
physician assistant, or midwife visits; SURGNX—Number of times had surgery; SURGOPX—
Number of outpatient surgery; and HSPNITX—Number of nights spend in hospital) are 
correlated with Q_RATIO at the .05 level. The other five (ERUSENX—Number of times went 
to a hospital ER room; HSPERX—Number of times admitted to a hospital through ER; 
TOTERX—Number of ER visits; HSPSTYN—Number of times stay in a hospital overnight or 
longer; and HSPNODX—Number of hospital stays excluding baby delivery) are not correlated 
to Q_RATIO in the county level.  
 
Table 3-5 Partial correlation between utilization and Q_RATIO 
 
Service Partial Correlation Significance
# of Physician Visits 0.149 0.010
# of Nurse Practioner Visits 0.248 <0.001
# of Surgeries 0.164 0.004
# of Nights Spent in Hospital 0.114 0.048
# of Outpatient Surgeries 0.113 0.049
# of Hospital Stays 0.069 0.235
# of Overnight Hospital Stays 0.094 0.104
# of ER visits 0.061 0.291
# of Hospital ER visits 0.065 0.265
# of Hospital Admission through ER 0.03 0.600
Sample Size   306
 
The reasons for such differences among different variables need further investigation, and we 
offer one possible reason: some services are more subject to the choices of patients and/or their 
physicians, and therefore more subject to the impacts of POMI than others. For example, 
physician or nurse practitioner visits and surgery are more subject to impact of POMI than ER 
visits or hospital stays. Patients with POMI may initiate physician visits or request for surgery 
based on the their own information, but ER visits or hospital stays are less influenced by such 
POMI. 
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For the five services that are correlated with Q_RATIO, while the correlation coefficients are all 
positive, suggesting that per capita utilization of these services tend to increase as Q_RATIO 
increases, the relationship is not obviously linear, as shown in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2 Scatter charts between Q_RATIO and Utilization 
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To assess possible nonlinearity in the relationship, two binary variables representing different 
levels of Q_RATIO (less than 30% or higher than 50%) were used in multiple regression 
analysis [41] for those five services that achieved statistical significance in the partial correlation 
analysis. Table 3-7 presents the results of such multiple regression models. Please note that as 
Q_RATIO is highly correlated to these binary variables representing different levels of 
Q_RATIO (Table 3-6), it is not appropriate to include Q_RATIO and any of these binary 
variables in the same regression model [40]. So two regression models were developed for every 
service, one contain Q_RATIO as independent (along with other control variables), the other 
contain the binary variables as independents (along with other control variables).  
 
Table 3-6 Correlation Coefficients (Significance) 
 
  Q_RATIO Binary Variable Representing Q<30%
Q_RATIO    
Binary Variable Representing Q<30% -0.642 (p<0.001)  
Binary Variable Representing Q>50% 0.560 (p<0.001) -0.107 (p=0.062)
Sample Size:   306
 
Table 3-7 suggests that two binary variables, Q_LESSTHAN30 and Q_LARGERTHAN50, 
contain almost all of the information Q_RATIO has in predicting utilization of these five 
services (only variables that achieved statistic significance at the .05 level were included in the 
models). This strongly indicates that there exist stepwise effects on the impact of Q_RATIO on 
utilization in the county level.  
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Table 3-7 Multiple Regression Results 
 
  DRVISNX MPVISNX SURGNX HSPNITX SURGOPX 
                      
  Beta t pBeta t pBeta t p Beta t pBeta t p
Constant  -4.62 <0.001    -4.91 <0.001 -5.07 <0.001
General Health 0.44 7.28 <0.001    0.32 5.95 <0.001 0.35 6.50 <0.001
Income 0.22 3.50 0.001         
Education           
Q_RATIO 0.20 3.68 <0.001 0.22 3.95 <0.001 0.23 4.29 <0.001 0.14 2.59 0.010   
Age 0.15 2.87 0.004  0.21 3.85 <0.001 0.14 2.61 0.010 0.17 3.21 0.001
Adjusted R2   0.242  0.046  0.089  0.152  0.170
            
Constant  -4.00 <0.001  -2.40 0.017 -4.23 <0.001 -5.07  
General Health 0.50 7.93 <0.001    0.32 5.87 <0.001 0.35 6.50 <0.001
Income 0.20 2.76 0.006        
Education     0.17 2.87 0.004     
Q_LARGER_50     0.12 2.31 0.043     
Q_LESS_30 -0.11 -2.11 0.036 -0.16 -2.88 0.004   -0.14 -2.58 0.010   
Age 0.14 2.64 0.009  0.21 3.80 <0.001 0.14 2.57 0.011 0.17 3.21 0.001
Adjusted R2   0.235  0.023  0.084  0.152  0.170
            
Sample Size                          306 
 71
To further shed light on possible nonlinearity of the relationship between per capita utilization 
and Q_RATIO, we divided these 306 counties into eight groups according to their Q_RATIO 
values, and used ANOVA to analyze the resulting trends. We divided the counties into groups so 
that each group has roughly the same number of counties (about 40 counties per group, except 
for the last group, since there were not enough counties with high portion of patients with 
POMI). To test the robustness of the analysis, we tried different ways to form these groups, both 
by forming different numbers of groups and by forming the groups in different ways (i.e., using 
different cut-off values between groups). The results are similar, indicating that the analysis is 
robust. Table 3-8 and figure 3.2 show the results of one particular way of breaking the counties 
into eight groups.  
 
Table 3-8 ANOVA: Q_RATIO group membership and utilization in the county level 
 
    SURGNX SURGOPX DRVISNX MPVISNX HSPNITX 
   
No. of 
observations      
Counties with  
Q_RATIO between:           
  9%-29% 43 0.18 0.12 3.41 0.29 0.41
  29%-33% 37 0.18 0.12 3.90 0.38 0.57
  33%-36% 46 0.22 0.16 3.83 0.37 0.54
  36%-39% 40 0.24 0.17 3.87 0.37 0.54
  39%-42% 41 0.23 0.16 4.10 0.34 0.57
  42%-45% 51 0.22 0.16 4.12 0.45 0.52
  45%-50% 32 0.20 0.13 4.02 0.38 0.47
  50%-71% 15 0.29 0.19 4.66 0.55 0.68
p Value   <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.087
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Figure 3.3 The nonlinear, non-monotonic relationship between per capita utilization and 
the portion of informed patients in US counties 
 
Table 3-8 shows that the differences in utilization between counties of different Q_RATIO are 
statistically significant for four variables (DRVISNX—Number of doctor visits; MPVISNX—
Number of nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or midwife visits; SURGNX—Number of 
times had surgery; SURGOPX—Number of outpatient surgery), while such difference is not 
statistically significant for HSPNITX (Number of nights spent in hospital), further confirming 
our reasoning that physician or nurse practitioner visits and surgery are more likely to be subject 
to the influence of POMI than hospital stays.  
 
Table 3-8 and Figure 3.2 show that when the portion of patients in a county who seek POMI 
increases, per capita healthcare services usage for those four services in that county tends to 
increase as well, although the trend is not monotonic. When the portion is low (below 30%), 
healthcare services usage tends to be low; when the portion is high (above 50%), usage tends to 
be high; when the portion is medium (between 30% and 50%), usage tends to remain the same 
level with little change when the portion changes. Figure 3.2 illustrates the nonlinear, non-
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monotonic relationship between per capita utilization and the portion of informed patients in US 
counties. 
 
One possible reason for such non-monotonic relationship might be that as more patients obtain 
POMI, they may demand new investments in equipment in their county, and new investments 
bring an increase in capacity. With the newly available capacity, patients in a county may get 
sudden increase in usage. There would not be such increase if the increase in the portion of 
patients with POMI were not enough to push for new investments in the county.  
 
Another possible reason might be that physicians tend to react to the characteristics of the patient 
population, so when more patients use POMI, physicians may shrift their practice style to 
become more responsive to patients’ request. Such sudden shrift in practice style brings the non-
monotonic relationship, as we showed in another paper [49]. Although existing studies on 
variations of physicians practice did not specifically link such variances with POMI, such 
variances do widely exist [32-36]. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our study found that of patients with POMI, most actually relied on more traditional sources 
such as friends/relatives and books/magazines for information. So while the Internet is playing 
an important role in providing medical information to patients, more traditional sources should 
not be ignored. Our study also suggested that of patients with the same level of general health 
condition, patients with POMI have higher healthcare services utilization than patients without 
POMI.  
 
Such results have important implications for equality of care. It suggests that we may alleviate 
the persistent disparities in healthcare utilization among different socioeconomic groups [6-10] if 
we can alleviate the disparities in access to medical information among these groups. Given that 
most patients actually gain medical information from more traditional sources, we may be able to 
circumvent the persistent digital divide [50-53] to reach those patients of lower socioeconomic 
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status who are less likely to have Internet access [11, 50] and who are usually in a disadvantaged 
position in terms of access to and utilization of healthcare services [6-10].   
 
We also found that, when the portion of patients with POMI increases in a county, per capita 
utilization of healthcare services that are more likely to be subject to the influence of POMI tend 
to increase, while utilization of other services show no consistent pattern. This may be one of the 
factors that contributes to the wide spread regional variances in healthcare utilization [12-20], as 
regions with more informed patients may see more utilization initiated by informed patients. 
Further studies to link the portion of informed patients in a region with utilization and health 
outcome can shed more light to the welfare implications of such phenomenon, as studies show 
that large regional variances in utilization have little (if any) impact on outcome [54-56]. As 
studies show that more informed patients and more active participation in decision making are 
positively linked to better outcome [57-61], it would be very interesting to see if regional 
variances caused by differences in patient information have any impact on outcome. 
 
Our study also found that of those services that see increase in utilization as the portion of 
informed patients increases, there seem to exist stepwise effects, in that utilization increase 
suddenly when the portion of informed patients crosses some critical values and remain stable 
otherwise. This suggests that utilization would not increase linearly as more patients seek POMI; 
utilization would increase only after enough patients seek POMI. In other words, providers 
would respond to informed patients’ request only when there exist enough such informed 
patients. For a patient with POMI who would like to have a particular treatment, it may be 
desirable to seek such services in a region where there exist enough informed patients. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
IMPACT OF POMI ON PHYSICIAN’S ATTITUDE 
 
Introduction 
 
With the increasing availability and accessibility of medical information through the Internet and 
other sources, there is hope that the Internet may help create a patient-centered healthcare system 
utilizing a shared decision making model between patients and their physicians [1-8]. While it is 
widely documented that increasingly more patients are obtaining medical information from the 
Internet and other sources [9-11] and that such patient obtained medical information (POMI) 
impacts on the physician-patient relationship [12-15] and on patient outcome [16-20], the 
potential for POMI to create a patient-centered healthcare system and a shared decision making 
model depends largely on the actions of physicians, as the physician is the gatekeeper of the 
healthcare system [21]. 
 
Existing evidence shows that physicians have mixed feelings about POMI and shared decision-
making [22-26]. Some see it as positive, while others cite time constraint, questionable quality of 
POMI and patients’ questionable ability to understand information as reasons for reservations 
[22-26]. Given the important role physicians play in the physician-patient interaction, different 
reactions on the physician side towards POMI will certainly have major implications on efforts 
to promote patient-centered healthcare and shared decision making. But little is known about 
how physicians factors, such as race, gender, practice type and other demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, impact physicians’ reaction to POMI. For example, while Murray 
et al listed physicians’ overall attitude towards POMI, they did not study if and how physicians 
with different characteristics differ on such attitude [23].  
 
Evidence shows that black patients or patients of color are more likely to see black physicians or 
physicians of color [27-31]. Given the disadvantages minority patients have on access to medical 
information [32] and utilization of healthcare [33-37], it would be helpful to know if minority 
physicians are more or less positive towards POMI than white physicians. Another example is 
the impact of physicians’ financial incentives on their attitude towards POMI, as studies show 
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that physicians’ financial incentive has significant impacts on physicians’ behavior and patients’ 
utilization [38-39]. It would be interesting to know if such financial incentives also impact 
physicians’ attitude towards POMI. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the differences in reaction to POMI among physicians of different 
demographic and socioeconomic groups. We found that physicians’ attitudes towards POMI and 
their willingness to order tests, procedures or prescriptions upon patients’ requests that they 
would not otherwise order are influenced by physicians’ demographic, socioeconomic and 
practice characteristics. Physicians of male gender, older age, international training, race other 
than white, and overall personal financial incentive favoring expanding services are more likely 
to have positive attitudes towards POMI and more willing to order tests, procedures or 
prescriptions upon patients’ requests. 
 
Study Data And Methods 
 
Data Source 
 
The data for our analysis were drawn from the 2000-2001 Community Tracking Study (CTS) 
Physician Survey. The CTS Physician Survey is a biannual nationally representative survey of 
physicians in the U.S. conducted by the Center for Studying Health System Change. The survey 
has been conducted three times (1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01), and approximately 12,000 
physicians were interviewed for each survey. The 2000-2001 CTS Physician Survey has a 
sample of 12406 physicians, and it includes each physician’s demographic, socioeconomic and 
professional characteristics, and his/her reactions to POMI. After excluding those with missing 
values, a total of 10706 physicians were included in our analysis. 
 
Physician’s Reaction to POMI 
 
Physician’s reaction to POMI is a multi-dimensional variable, as various studies have viewed it 
from different aspects [22-26]. In our study, we include the physician’s opinion about the 
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impacts of POMI on physician’s efficiency, on her2 ability to provide high quality care, and on 
her willingness to recommend treatments upon requests from patients with POMI that she would 
otherwise not recommend as indicators of physician’s reaction to POMI.  
 
Specifically, we used three variables from the 2000-2001 CTS Physician Survey to measure a 
physician’s reaction to POMI. The first one is PATACT, the percentage of patients she ordered 
tests, procedures, or prescriptions (refer to as services hereafter) suggested by patients that she 
would not otherwise have ordered during the last month. It ranges from 0 to 100. After 
controlling the percentage of patients discussing medical conditions, tests, treatments or drugs 
they (patients) learned from POMI, this variable (PATACT) measures the physician’s 
willingness to order treatments per the requests of patients. The second metric is EFEFF, the 
physician’s opinion (negative, neutral, positive) on the effect of medical information obtained by 
her patients from non physician sources on her efficiency. It has three possible values (1-
negative, 2-netural, 3-positive). The third variable is EFINFO, the physician’s opinion (1-
negative, 2-neutral, 3-positive) on the effect of POMI on her ability to provide high quality care.  
 
Correlation results in Table 4-1 show that PATACT is not correlated to the other two variables 
(treating EFEFF and EFINFO as interval variables), so PATACT measures a different construct 
with the other two variables. The correlation coefficients between EFEFF and EFINFO (as 
interval variables or as ordinal variables) are low, suggesting that while there exists overlap on 
what these two variables measure, one variable still provides significant new information about 
the physician’s attitude towards POMI even when we know the value of the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For convenience, we assume that the physician is a female and the patient male. 
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Table 4-1 Correlation Coefficients (Significance) 
 
  EFEFF EFINFO 
     
EFINFO 
Person's R 0.419 
(p<0.001) 
Gamma: 0.579 (p<0.001) 
Kendall's tau-b: 0.385 
(p<0.001) 
  
PATACT 0.006 (p=0.536) -0.002 (p=0.831) 
Sample Size: 10706 
 
Physician’s Demographic, Socioeconomic And Practice Characteristics 
 
We included information about the age, gender, ethnicity, income, years in practice, country of 
training, specialty, geographic setting and overall personal financial incentive of each physician 
in our analysis. Most of these variables are widely used in the literature [40-42]. Please refer to 
Table 4-2 for detailed description for these variables. 
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Table 4-2 Variable description 
 
Variable Description Value 
AGE Age 
Range: 28-100; Mean: 46.6; 
 Median: 45 
GENDER Gender 
1 Male 
2 Female 
YRS_PRCT Years in practice 
Range: 0-58; Mean: 14.3;  
Median: 13 
RACE_GRP Race 
1 White 
2 Black 
3 Asian or Pacific Islander 
4 Other 
MSACAT Geographic Setting 
1 Large metro over 200k 
2 Small metro under 200k 
3 Rural 
AMAPRIM Specialty 
1 Primary care 
2 Non-primary care 
IMGUSPR Country of training 
1 US 
2 Foreign 
INCENT Financial incentive 
1 Favor reducing services 
2 Favor expanding services 
3 Favor neither 
INCOMET 1999 income from practice 
Range: 0-400,000; Mean: 
157,307; Median: 140,000 
EFEFF Opinion on the impact of POMI on efficiency 
1 Negative 
2 Netural 
3 Positive 
EFINFO 
Opinion on the impact of POMI on ability to  
provide high quality care 
1 Negative 
2 Netural 
3 Positive 
PATACT 
Percentage of patients ordered tests, procedures,  
or prescriptions SUGGESTED BY PATIENTS that  
would not otherwise have ordered during last month 
Range: 0-100; Mean: 4.36; 
Median: 2 
PATINFO 
Percentage of patients talked about medical  
conditions, tests, treatments, or drugs they had read  
or heard about from other sources during last month 
Range: 0-100; Mean: 18.2; 
Median: 10 
 
Analysis 
 
In the three variables measuring physician’s reaction to POMI, two are ordinal (EFEFF and 
EFINFO), one is interval (PATACT). Since PATACT has a highly skewed distribution (Figure 
4-1), it was transformed into an ordinal variable in descriptive and regression analysis, although 
ordinary least square regression was also performed to see if such OLS regression yields 
different results. PATACT was categorized into three groups (0%, 1-4%, 5-100%) so that each 
group has roughly the same number of physicians to avoid difficulties in  tests and logistic 
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regression analysis [43]. While such categorization facilitates  tests and logistic regression 
analysis, it ignores information on the high end (since 5-100% was categorized into one group, 
information on the differences within this group was not used), so results of tests and logistic 
regression analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
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Figure4.1 Highly skewed distribution of PATACT 
 
For descriptive analysis,  tests were used to compare differences in demographic, 
socioeconomic and practice characteristics among physician groups with different attitudes 
towards POMI. Consistent with common practice in the literature [44-45], continuous variables 
such as income and age were categorized into categorical variables to facilitate  tests. 
Considering large sample sizes as well as a high number of comparisons, statistical significance 
for these comparisons was set at .01, reducing the Meehl effect [46] and the likelihood of chance 
significance. All p-values were 2-sided. 
 
To further assess the adjusted predictive powers of various demographic, socioeconomic and 
practice characteristics on physician’s attitudes towards POMI, ordinal logistic regression 
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analysis for all three dependant variables and multivariate ordinary least square regression (for 
PATACT as an interval variable) were performed. In the ordinal logistic regression analysis, 
continuous variables such as age and income were categorized into categorical variables to avoid 
the creation of a very large cell probabilities table [47]. Because the dependant variables are 
ordinal variables with three categories, ordinal logistic regression was preferable over 
multinomial logistic regression or ordinary least square regression [43].  
 
All analyses were performed with SPSS, Version 13 (SPSS Inc, Chicago, Ill). 
 
Results 
 
Overall Characteristics Of The Sample 
 
Table 4-3 presents the overall characteristics of the sample. These characteristics are comparable 
to the American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile in the same time period and 
other national representative physician surveys [23] with the exception of a slight under 
representation of older (60+ years old), high income ($250k+ annual income), and US trained 
physicians. 
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Table 4-3 Overall characteristics of the sample 
 
   No. (%) 
Gender   
  Female 2792 (26.1) 
  Male 7914 (73.9) 
Ethnicity   
  White 8573 (80.1) 
  Black 434 (4.1) 
  Asian or Pacific Islander 1307 (12.2) 
  Other 392 (3.6) 
Age (years)   
  <=39 2876 (26.9) 
  40-49 4141 (38.7) 
  50-59 2486 (23.2) 
  60+ 1203 (11.2) 
Years in practice   
  0-14 6013 (56.2) 
  15-29 3806 (35.6) 
  30-44 783 (7.3) 
  45 + 104 (1.0) 
1999 income from practice($)   
  <100,000 2740 (25.6) 
  100,001-150,000 3724 (34.8) 
  150,001-200,000 2068 (19.3) 
  200,001-250,000 940 (8.8) 
  250,001 + 1234 (11.5) 
Geographic setting   
  Large metro over 200k 9220 (86.1) 
  Small metro under 200k 369 (3.4) 
  Rural 1117 (10.4) 
Type of medical specity   
  Prime care 6986 (65.3) 
  Non-prime care 3720 (34.7) 
Country of training   
  US 8562 (80.0) 
  Foreign 2144 (20.0) 
Overall Personal Financial Incentive   
  Favor Reducing Serv 854 (8.0) 
  Favor Neither 7331 (68.5) 
  Favor Expanding Serv 2521 (23.5) 
Total respondents 10706 
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Physicians’ Reaction To POMI 
 
Table 4-4 presents physicians’ encounter with and reactions towards POMI. 
 
Table 4-4 Physicians' encounter with and reaction to POMI 
 
    No. (%) 
During the last month, what percentage of your patients talked about medical conditions,  
tests, treatments, or drugs they had read or heard about from various sources other than you? 
  0% 100 (1.0) 
  1-25% 8451 (78.9) 
  26%-50% 1603 (15.0) 
  51%-75% 354 (3.3) 
  76%-100% 198 (1.8) 
During the last month, for what percentage of your  patients did you order tests, procedures,  
or prescriptions SUGGESTED BY PATIENTS that you would not otherwise have ordered? 
  0% 3617 (33.7) 
  1-25% 6884 (64.3) 
  26%-50% 170 (1.6) 
  51%-75% 23 (0.2) 
  76%-100% 12 (0.1) 
On balance, what do you think is the effect of medical information obtained by your patients 
 from sources other than you on your EFFICIENCY? 
  Positive 2811 (26.3) 
  Neutral 4475 (41.8) 
  Negative 3420 (31.9) 
On balance, what do you think is the effect of medical information obtained by your patients  
from sources other than you on your ability to provide HIGH QUALITY CARE? 
  Positive 5134 (48.0) 
  Neutral 3834 (35.8) 
  Negative 1738 (16.2) 
Total Respondents 10706 
 
It can be seen from Table 4-4 that most physicians have some patients talking about information 
they obtained from other sources, and quite large percentage (66.3%) ordered tests, procedures or 
prescriptions suggested by patients that their would not otherwise have ordered (referred to as 
order upon request hereafter). It can also be seen that significant number of physicians (31.9%) 
believe that POMI have a negative impact on efficiency and on their ability to provide high 
quality care (16.2%). Such results are consistent with existing studies [23]. 
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Differences In Physicians’ Attitudes Towards POMI  
 
Table 4-5 presents results of tests comparing the differences in attitudes towards POMI among 
physicians of different characteristics. As discussed earlier, because of the way PATACT was 
categorized, results of PATACT should be interpreted with caution. 
 
It can be seen from table 4-5 that overall, physicians are more likely to have negative opinion 
about the impacts of POMI on efficiency than on their ability to provide high quality of care, 
indicating that time constraints are an important factor in how physicians react to POMI, a 
conclusion shared by other studies [48-50]. 
 
It can also be seen that physicians’ income and geographic setting do not have statistically 
significant impact on physicians’ opinions about the impacts POMI on efficiency, indicating that 
the issue of time constraint exists across board, and the practice environment does not seem to 
make a large difference in this front. On the other hand, physicians’ age, gender, ethnicity, years 
in practice, country of training and overall personal financial incentive are statistically significant 
on physicians’ opinion on the impacts of POMI on efficiency. For example, younger physicians 
(in terms of both age and years in practice) are more likely to have negative opinion on the 
impacts of POMI on efficiency. Another finding is that female physicians are more likely to have 
negative opinion about the impacts of POMI on efficiency. This is surprising, given our culture 
of females being assumed to be more gentle and patient. As to country of training and overall 
personal financial incentive, physicians trained in the US and physicians with overall personal 
financial incentive favor reducing services are more likely to have negative opinion about the 
impacts of POMI on efficiency. 
 
On physicians’ opinion of the impacts of POMI on their ability to provide high quality care, only 
type of medical specialty and overall personal financial incentive are statistically significant 
(although ethnicity was statistically significant, it did not show a consistent pattern of impacts), 
Primary care physicians and physicians with overall personal financial incentive favor reducing 
services are more likely to have negative opinion about the impacts of POMI on their ability to 
provide high quality care. 
 Table 4-5 Different reactions to POMI among physicians of different characteristics 
 
    EFEFF EFINFO PATACT 
                    
   Negative Neutral Positive Chi-Squ Negative Neutral Positive Chi-Squ 0% 1-4% 5-100% Chi-Squ 
Gender                         
  Female 36.0 39.8 24.3 28.4 (df=2 16.3 36.7 47.0 1.6 (df=2 31.8 29.2 39.0 7.3 (df=2 
  Male 30.5 42.5 27.0 p<0.001) 16.2 35.5 48.3 p=0.451) 34.5 27.5 28.0 p=0.027) 
Ethnicity              
  White 34.6 42.8 22.6 323.5 (df= 16.7 35.6 47.7 17.0 (df=6 33.7 29.1 37.2 62.9 (df=6 
  Black 22.1 38.7 39.2 6, p<0.001) 14.1 35.9 50.0 p=0.009) 40.8 24.7 34.6 p<0.001) 
  Asian or Pacific Islander 19.7 38.6 41.6   13.1 38.2 48.7   30.4 23.7 45.9   
  Other 26.3 33.9 39.8   19.1 31.9 49.0   39.3 19.9 40.8   
Age (years)                         
  <=39 35.1 40.5 24.4 119.9 (df= 16.50 37.4 46.1 12.3 (df=6 27.7 29.2 43.2 96.2 (df=6 
  40-49 34.4 41.0 24.6 6, p<0.001) 16.90 34.3 48.9 p=0.056) 33.7 28.0 38.3 p<0.001) 
  50-59 30.0 43.0 27.1   15.8 35.8 48.4   37.7 27.4 34.9   
  60+ 20.0 45.4 34.6   14.5 37.3 48.2   40.6 26.3 33.2   
Years in practice              
  0-14 33.9 41.3 24.8 76.8 (df=6 16.5 36.6 46.8 10.2 (df=6 31.5 27.9 40.6 55.1 (df=6 
  15-29 31.5 41.7 26.7 p<0.001) 16 34.2 49.8 p=0.118) 35.8 28.5 35.7 p<0.001) 
  30-44 21.1 46.0 33.0   14.9 36.7 48.4   40.1 27.5 32.4   
  45 + 15.4 43.3 41.3   16.3 39.4 44.2   46.2 17.3 36.5   
1999 income from practice($)                         
  <100,000 31.7 39.9 28.4 15.5 (df= 16.8 35.4 47.7 10.5 (df=8 32.2 28.2 39.6 90.6 (df=8 
  100,001-150,000 32.4 41.5 26.1 8, p=0.051) 16.2 37.3 46.5 p=0.234) 30.6 28.3 41.1 p<0.001) 
  150,001-200,000 32.2 42.2 25.6   16.7 34.9 48.5   33.3 29.2 37.5   
  200,001-250,000 30.3 45.9 23.8   15.1 34.3 50.6   39.7 26.7 33.6   
  250,001 + 31.9 43.0 25.0   15.1 35.0 49.9   43.3 25.3 31.4   
Geographic setting              
  Large metro over 200k 32.1 41.6 26.2 7.6 (df=4 16.2 36.2 47.6 8.4 (df=4 34.2 27.9 37.9 12.3 (df=4 
  Small metro under 200k 27.9 48.5 23.6 p=0.106) 14.4 30.9 54.7 p=0.079) 34.4 23.6 42.0 p=0.015) 
  Rural 32.0 40.8 27.2   16.8 34.5 48.7   33.0 30.3 39.7   
Type of medical specity                         
  Prime care 33.8 39.7 26.5 41.9 (df=2 17.8 36.0 46.2 43.6 (df=2 27.2 30.0 42.8 393.6 (df=2 
  Non-prime care 28.5 45.7 25.8 p<0.001) 13.3 35.5 51.2 p<0.001) 46.1 24.2 29.7 p<0.001) 
Country of training              
  US 35.5 42.2 22.4 415.2 (df=2 16.2 36.0 47.8 1.0 (df=2 33.6 29.2 37.2 36.0 (df=2 
  Foreign 17.8 40.4 41.8 p<0.001) 16.4 34.9 48.7 p=0.602) 34.4 23.1 42.5 p<0.001) 
Overall Personal Fina Incent                         
  Favor Reducing Serv 39.5 36.8 23.8 51.2 (df=2 22.8 33.8 43.3 61.5 (df=4 28.6 27.5 43.9 24.8 (df=4 
  Favor Neither 31.5 43.3 25.2 p<0.001) 15.9 37.3 46.7 p<0.001) 35.0 27.9 37.0 p<0.001) 
  Favor Expanding Serv 30.6 39.1 30.3   15 32.0 53.0   31.9 28.2 39.9   
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Adjusted Predictive Powers Of Various Characteristics 
 
Table 4-6 presents results of ordinal logistic regression models for all three dependant variables. 
Again, because of the way PATACT was categorized, results of PATACT should be interpreted 
with caution. 
 
Please note that as age and years in practice were highly correlated (Person Correlation: 0.901), 
years in practice was not included in the regression models. Only variables with statistical 
significance were included in the table. It can be seen from Table 4-6 that income and 
geographic setting did not achieve statistical significance for all three variables, indicating that 
they have no predictive power on physician’s attitude towards POMI. On the other hand, overall 
personal financial incentive and type of medical specialty achieve statistical significance for all 
three variables, suggesting that these two factors impact all three aspects of physician’s attitude 
towards POMI. 
 
On physician’s opinion on the impact of POMI on efficiency, Table 4-6 shows that male 
physicians are more likely to have positive opinion (odds ratio: 1.18, 95% CI: 1.08-1.28) than 
females. It also shows that physicians of non-white ethnicity, older age, engaged in non-prime 
care, trained outside the US, and with overall personal financial incentive favoring expanding 
services are more likely to have a positive opinion on the impact of POMI on efficiency. The 
influences of ethnicity, age and country of training are especially large, as physicians of ethnicity 
other than white are much more likely to have positive opinion than white physicians (Black: 
odds ratio: 2.14, 95% CI: 1.79-2.57; Asian: odds ratio: 1.67, 95% CI: 1.42-1.83; Other: odds 
ratio: 1.66, 95% CI: 1.37-2.01), physicians 60 years or older are almost two times as likely to 
have positive opinion than physicians 39 years or younger (odds ratio: 1.75, 95% CI: 1.54-2.00), 
and foreign trained physicians are more than two times likely to have positive opinion than US 
trained ones (odds ratio: 2.05, 95% CI: 1.85-2.27). 
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Table 4-6 Ordinal Logistic Regression Results 
 
    EFEFF EFINFO PATACT 
              
   OR (95% CI) p OR (95% CI) p OR (95% CI) p 
Gender        
  Female 1.00           
  Male 1.18 (1.08-1.28) <0.001         
Ethnicity        
  White 1.00       1.00   
  Black 2.14 (1.79-2.57) <0.001   0.73 (0.61-0.87) <0.001 
  Asian or Pacific Islander 1.61 (1.42-1.83) <0.001     1.21 (1.09-1.36) 0.001 
  Other 1.66 (1.37-2.01) <0.001     0.91 (0.75-1.10) 0.319 
Age (years)        
  <=39 1.00       1.00   
  40-49 1.02 (0.93-1.11) 0.744   0.85 (0.77-0.93) <0.001 
  50-59 1.15 (1.04-1.28) <0.001     0.73 (0.66-0.81) <0.001 
  60+ 1.75 (1.54-2.00) <0.001     0.66 (0.58-0.75) <0.001 
Type of medical specity        
  Prime care 1.00   1.00   1.00   
  Non-prime care 1.15 (1.07-1.24) <0.001 1.25 (1.16-1.35) <0.001 0.51 (0.47-0.55) <0.001 
Country of training        
  US 1.00           
  Foreign 2.05 (1.85-2.27) <0.001         
Overall Personal Fina Incent        
  Favor Reducing Serv 0.80 (0.70-0.91) <0.001 0.80 (0.70-0.91) 0.001 1.33 (1.16-1.52)   
  Favor Neither 1.00  1.00  1.00   
  Favor Expanding Serv 1.17 (1.07-1.27) <0.001 1.23 (1.12-1.34) <0.001 1.16 (1.06-1.26) 0.001 
Total Sample Size:           10706 
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On physician’s opinion on the impact of POMI on her ability to perform high quality care, Table 
4-6 shows that only type of medical specialty and overall personal financial incentive have 
significant influences. In these two factors, the influences on physician’s opinion on the impact 
of POMI on her ability to perform high quality care are similar to the influences on her opinion 
on the impact of POMI on efficiency. 
 
On physician’s likelihood to order upon patient’s requests, physician’s ethnicity, age, type of 
medical specialty and overall personal financial incentive are significant. Table 4-6 shows that 
compare to white physicians, Asian physicians are more likely to order upon patient’s requests 
(odds ratio: 1.21, 95% CI: 1.09-1.36), while physicians of other ethnicity are less likely to do so. 
Age is still a significant predictor on physician’s likelihood of ordering upon requests, although 
Table 4-6 shows that older physicians are less likely to do so than younger ones. This is very 
interesting as we previously discussed that older physicians are more likely to have positive 
opinion on the impacts of POMI on efficiency. It appears that while older physicians are more 
likely to listen to their patients’ POMI, they are less likely to agree with their patients requests 
based on such POMI.  
 
Table 4-6 also shows that non-primary care physicians are half as likely as primary care 
physicians to order upon requests (odds ratio: 0.51, 95% CI: 0.47-0.55), although previous 
discussion showed that they are more likely to have positive opinion on the impacts of POMI on 
both efficiency and their ability to perform high quality care.  The reason maybe that the 
information asymmetry between a non-primary care physician and her patients is likely to be 
more significant than that between a primary care physician and her patients. On one hand, 
patients’ POMI are likely to be general, as information about a particular specialty is difficult to 
obtain and to understand; on the other hand, non-primary care physicians are more informed 
about their specialties due to their training. Given such information asymmetry, non-primary care 
physicians are less likely to order upon requests. 
 
Since PATACT is an interval variable with a highly skewed distribution, ordinary least square 
regression may produce questionable results [51], but we still used it to compare the results of 
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the ordinal logistic regression analysis. Table 4-7 shows the results of multiple OLS regression. 
Only variables with statistic significance are included in the model. 
 
Table 4-7 Results of OLS regression analysis (dependant variable: PATACT *) 
 
    
Standardized  
Coefficients t Statistics p value 
Constant  12.798 <.001 
Gender -0.044 -4.625 <.001 
Ethnicity     
  Asian or Pacific Islander 0.057 5.395 <0.001 
Type of medical specity -0.134 -14.361 <.001 
Country of training 0.060 5.686 <.001 
Overall Personal Financial Incentive     
  Favor Reducing Serv 0.032 3.425 <.001 
  Favor Expanding Serv 0.025 2.630 0.009 
Sample Size   10706 
Adjusted R Square   0.101 
Std. Error of Estimate     7.204 
* Control for PATINFO       
 
It can be seen from Table 4-7 that a physician’s age, gender, type of medical specialty, country 
of training, Asian or pacific islands ethnicity and overall personal financial incentive are 
statistically significant in predicting likelihood of ordering upon requests. Together, these factors 
account for about 10% of the variance in physicians’ likelihood to order upon requests. 
Comparing to the results of ordinal logistic regression, OLS regression includes more factors as 
predictive over physicians’ likelihood to order upon requests, as gender and country of training 
are not significant in ordinal logistic regression but are significant in OLS regression. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our study suggests that physicians attitudes towards POMI and their likelihood to order tests, 
procedures or prescriptions upon patients’ requests that they would not otherwise order may be 
influenced by their demographic, socioeconomic and practice characteristics. Such findings have 
two major implications. 
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Firstly, in our efforts to build a patient-centered healthcare system in which physicians and 
patients share decision-making power, it may be helpful to target physicians of certain 
demographic, socioeconomic and/or practice groups or to design payment schemes of particular 
style in order to change their opinions about POMI and their willingness to listen to their 
patients. For example, our study suggests that physicians whose overall personal financial 
incentive favors expanding services are more likely to react favorably toward POMI. So we 
should carefully design physicians financial incentive schemes to induce our desired behavior. 
While using financial incentive favoring reducing services may achieve cost saving goals in the 
short run, we should not neglect the negative impacts of such incentive scheme on physicians’ 
attitude towards POMI and their willingness to listen to their patients. 
 
Secondly, individual patients armed with medical information could seek physicians more likely 
to have positive attitudes towards POMI for a more favorable relationship. For example, our 
study suggests that older physicians are more likely to have positive opinion about the impacts of 
POMI on efficiency, indicating that they would be more willing to spend time listening to their 
patients. Since young patients are more likely to search medical information before visiting their 
physicians and to desire more active role in medical decision making [32], they can probably get 
a more favorable attitude towards their information if they visit older physicians. Another 
example is that physicians trained outside the US are more likely to have more favorable opinion 
about POMI and more willing to listen to their patients. As patients of international background 
or patients of color are more likely to have difficulties in the communication with physicians, 
such patients may be better off to visits physicians trained outside the US or physicians of color 
to get a better communication.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I investigated the impact of patient-obtained medical information (POMI) on 
the physician-patient relationship when the physician does not observe perfectly a patient’s 
information level. It was found that the physician-patient relationship has some important 
characteristics that are not captured by existing studies when we take this into consideration. In 
such a situation, the relationship is shaped not only by the individual patient’s information level, 
but also by the overall information of the population (e.g., certain socioeconomic and/or health 
condition group) that the patient comes from. The physician’s socioeconomic, demographic and 
practice characteristics also impact the relationship. 
 
Such findings have significant policy and practical implications. On the policy level, my 
dissertation computed that providing medical information to patients would change physician 
behavior and the physician-patient relationship only when such changes in information are 
significant enough at the population level to induce behavior changes from the physician. 
Otherwise, changes in individual patient’s information level will have no impact on the 
physician-patient relationship. So, in our efforts to build a patient-centered healthcare system [1-
5] with physicians and patients sharing medical decision making process [6-12], we should target 
population groups that are not well informed so as to help induce behavior changes from the 
physician. Efforts to provide information to these population groups will not only benefit those 
to whom we provide information, but should also benefit the whole population groups. Since 
evidence shows that patients of certain socioeconomic characteristics and/or diseases [13-14] are 
likely to be less informed, we should focus our attention on these population groups.  
 
As these patients are likely to have limited ability to understand medical information and 
information not understood have no benefits [15-20], we should aim to improve the health 
literacy [21-25] rate of such population groups. Since these patient groups are also in a 
disadvantaged position in access and utilization of healthcare [26-32], such efforts may also help 
alleviate or eliminate the wide-spread and persistent disparities in access and utilization of 
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healthcare among patients of different socioeconomic groups [33-37] or among different 
geographic regions [38-46]. 
 
On the practical level, although individual patient’s information level does not change a 
particular physician’s behavior, patients armed with medical information can still seek 
physicians more likely to have positive attitudes towards POMI to get the most desirable results. 
For example, our study suggests that older physicians may be more likely to have positive 
opinion about the impacts of POMI on efficiency, indicating that they would be more willing to 
spend time listening to their patients. Since young patients are more likely to search medical 
information before visiting their physicians and to desire more active role in medical decision 
making [13-14], they can probably get a more favorable attitude towards their information if they 
visit older physicians.  
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